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Flying High In A Competitive Industry 
During the first 9-months of 2019, solid demand for air travel supported a 6.4% 
growth of passenger revenue for Delta Air Lines, Inc. (DAL: NYSE), a slowdown 
on its growth momentum compared to 2018’s homologous period of 7.8%. 
However, several data points from Q3 earnings’ suggests cautious given the 
decelerating RASM (-4.9% vs Q2), coupled with less than proportional decrease 
in CASM-Ex Fuel (only -3.8% vs Q2), introducing some uncertainty over DAL’s 
ability to keep margins above its peers, especially due to the labor contracts’ 
revision that took place during Q4 (an outcome to be reflected in the 2020 results). 
Notwithstanding, even with OPEX constraining growth, DAL improved its overall 
profitability versus Q2 (e.g., EBITDA Margin increased by 73 bps, to 20.18%). 
On a pure stock performance perspective, 2019 was a modest year for DAL, with 
a 23.2% price appreciation, while in the same period the S&P500 appreciated 
24.1% (though, above the 13.0% appreciation of DJUSAR). However, the 
company keeps rewarding its shareholders having returned until Q3 $721 mln in 
dividends and $1,802 mln via share-buybacks – in line with the commitments to 
return ~$2.5 bln during 20219FY, made in the begging of the year. 
Bottom-line, DAL currently is one of the best well-run airlines, with industry leading 
operations, consistent high pre-tax earnings, a high-quality balance sheet with a 
steady Debt/EBITDAR below 2.0x and the best in-class free cash flow generation. 
At the operational level, it is expected to keep pursuing its premium revenue growth 
strategy with passenger mile yield improvement and taking advantage, not only of 
its unique route structure and frequent flyer program/brand value, but also of a 
continued weak competition capacity - in part due to extended grounding of 737 
MAX (at least during 2020Q1) and a ~$1bln incremental revenue income (over 5-
years) from the recent JV with LATAM. This all combined, with a global industry 
outlook suggesting a sustained demand growth, guides DAL’s proposed fair value 
estimate to $112.34 per share, for 2020. 
Company Profile | Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
Delta Air Lines, Inc. provides scheduled air transportation for passengers and cargo over a 
network of routes in the US and across the world. The Company's segments include Airline and 
Refinery. The Company's route network is centered around 16 major worldwide hubs with 
connectivity to key market airports across regions. Additionally, it includes its international JV’s, 
its alliances with other foreign airlines, its membership in SkyTeam and agreements with multiple 
domestic regional carriers that operate as Delta Connection. The Company also provides aircraft 
MRO services; vacation packages to third-party consumers as well as aircraft charter and private 
jet services, management programs and services. The Refinery segment consists of jet fuel and 
non-jet fuel products. Headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia (GA), United States, Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
was founded in 1924 and listed on May 2007.
 DELTA AIR LINES, INC. COMPANY REPORT  
 AIR TRANSPORTATION - AIRLINES JANUARY 3RD, 2020  
 STUDENTS: FRANCISO SILVA / PEDRO PEREIRA 33976@novasbe.pt / 33968@novasbe.pt  
Recommendation: STRONG BUY 
  
Price Target FY20: 112.34 $ 
  
Price, as of 1-Dec-2019 57.31 $ 
Reuters: DAL.N, Bloomberg: DAL:US 
  
52-week range ($) 45.08 – 63.44 
Market Cap ($ mln) 37,064.83 
Outstanding Shares (mln) 646.74 
Free Float (%) 99.6% 
Avg. Volume (mln) 6.19 






in $ millions 2018 2019E 2020F 
Revenues 43,890 46,965 48,185 
EBITDAR 8,526 10,415 11,324 
EBITDAR Margin 19.43% 22.18% 23.50% 
Net Profit 3,935 4,852 5,368 
Net Margin 8.86% 10.20% 11.00% 
Basic EPS 5.69 7.50 8.30 
Debt-to-EBITDAR 1.94x 1.83x 1.72x 
D/E Ratio 1.29 1.19 1.01 
Net CAPEX 4,246 7,111 4,659 
ROIC 19.91% 17.63% 17.46% 
EV/Sales 1.16x 1.08x 1.06x 
EV/EBITDAR 5.96x 4.87x 4.49x 
EV/EBITDA 6.33x 5.23x 4.81x 
P/E 9.38x 7.37x 6.90x 
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Executive Summary: Analysts’ Foreword 
This equity research report will first be focusing on the North American arline industry, analysing its current form, as well as 
looking at industry’s opportunities and threats ahead. On top of this, an outlook over the airline industry will also be 
presented in order to give the investors an accurate view of the present and the future. A further analysis will then be 
conducted with regards do Delta Air Lines Inc. (DAL:NYSE), applying the previous research to provide a fair valuation for 
the group, resulting in an sustained recommendation of whether an investor should consider invest in DAL, or not. 
Airlines Industry Overview & Outlook 
Fundamentals Of The Industry 
Historically the airline industry is perceived as a highly cyclical sector, predominantly tied to 
the macroeconomic conditions which in turn dictates the levels of demand for air travel. 
Additionally, the industry encompasses several complexities given that it is exposed to various 
factors, such as: i) commodity price fluctuations and labour unions involvement/revindication 
(as fuel and labour expenses make up almost half of airlines OPEX); ii) high fixed costs related 
to aircraft rents, given that the industry is capital-intensive (which is also vulnerable to 
fluctuations in interest rates, as leasing facilities make up a significant part of the fleet that 
airlines have at their disposal); and iii) the global and regional economic condition, as it not 
only impacts the wealth of consumers but also the economic activity at the trade level.  
Given the industry’s cyclicality, in an attempt to trace potential scenarios for the industry’s 
health and conditions, one must look at several macroeconomic indicators that correlate with 
airline demand and/or revenue, such as GDP or Purchasing Managers Composite Index 
(PMI), to provide some insights into its outlook (at least in the short term). 
Airline’s dependence on macroeconomics, such as GDP growth. By computing the 
correlation between YoY GDP growth and the YoY airlines’ revenue growth, a significant 
correlation is found showing that airlines revenue is dependent on the overall 
macroeconomic condition. In fact, considering only the US GDP and Operating YoY 
growths, since 2000, a positive correlation coefficient above 70% can be found.  
Market confidence weighs on airlines demand and revenue. By analysing the 
relationship with the PMI (a macro indicator that aims addresses the economic health, based 
on the diffusion of 5 equally weighted indexes aiming to bring insight into current business 
conditions and confidence), statistical evidence found shows that a positive correlation of 
68% exists between ASM YoY growth and the PMI lagged by 1-quarter (considering the 
period’s PMI, correlation coefficient is slightly lower at 65%). Translating the demand into 
revenues, statistical findings let one infer that an even stronger correlation exists with a 
positive coefficient of 73%, also with a 1-quarter lagged PMI (at this level by considering the 
period’s PMI, the correlation coefficient is significantly lower at 53%).   
[Note: A PMI above 50 represents an expansion 
when compared with the previous month. A PMI 
reading under 50 represents a contraction, and 
a reading at 50 indicates no change] 
 
Sources: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, F41 
Schedule, P12 data; World Bank 
Graph 1 | Long-term US Airlines YoY 
Revenue Growth vs US GDP Growth 
Sources: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, F41 
Schedule, P12 data; Quandl data 
Graph 2 | Long-term US Airlines YoY 
Revenue Growth vs PMI 
Sources: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, F41 
Schedule, P12 data; Quandl data 
Graph 3 | US Airlines YoY ASM Growth vs 
PMI with 1-Quarter Lag 
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▪ Insights On Airline Supply And Demand 
Available Seat Miles (ASM) is the standard industry measure of capacity and is one of the few 
inputs that airlines can control. Capacity can be added through various forms: by purchasing 
new aircraft, increasing aircraft flight frequency, increasing average seats in the aircraft and 
by reusing grounded aircrafts. Most commonly, when airlines want to increase capacity, they 
first tend to increase the number of flights with their current fleet and/or add more seats to the 
existing fleet, and only afterwards consider increasing their fleet size. Partnering with regional 
airlines and entering in code sharing agreements are also solutions that airlines use to absorb 
demand in market niches they want to connect and explore, but that do not show enough 
demand to increase the level of the fleet size. This way, typically major airlines such as DAL, 
UAL and AAL, use regional partners to complement their mainline network without the need 
to employ so much capital. Since 1995 US airlines supply capacity increased at a CAGR of 
1.9%. During the same period, the number of aircrafts making up the total US airlines fleet 
increased just at a 0.9% CAGR, with the average daily block hour utilization of total operating 
fleet, growing at 0.5% CAGR to almost 11 hours per day. This increase in aircraft use shows 
a viable option for airlines to increase their capacity to capture incremental revenues. This 
suggests that the airline industry structure encourages oversupply, as an incremental flight is 
not only able to decrease unit costs as it can also improve unit revenues relative to 
competitors. The rationale for this is that by increasing the frequency of flights to a certain route 
or hub, an airline is growing its capacity market share. Since passengers tend to concentrate 
their flying habits on the airline that offers them more options to maximize frequent flyer 
benefits, airlines that have more flights tend to attract a higher share of passengers and, 
therefore, their share of revenues tend to increase more than proportionally. An interesting 
takeaway to bear in mind regarding airlines supply capacity concerns the relationship between 
the relative low barriers to entry and the tough barriers to exit. Essentially, to get started airlines 
need only two things: passengers to board (which by not having any switching costs are 
“easy” to attract) and funding capital to purchase aircrafts, which is relatively easy to achieve 
given the several leasing alternatives airlines have at their disposal, as well as the ability to 
contract debt using the aircraft as collateral. This industry deregulation and low barriers to entry 
tend to set an upper limit on the average fares charged (as typically new entrants focus on 
low fares to gain market share from the incumbents) and consequently on the potential 
revenue gains from the established carriers. However, an airline considering an exit strategy, 
or removing inefficient capacity from the system, faces barriers to do so, namely high exit costs 
and bankruptcy protection To exit the industry, airlines need to retain many fixed expenses, 
such as their air traffic liability (i.e., they would have to refund all tickets not yet flown), the 
leasing contract covenants violations and a several sunk costs on hangars, office spaces and 
other equipment. Still, even with the liquidation of the company, in terms of industry system 
capacity, the effect typically turns out to be null given the large economic useful life of an aircraft 
that usually ed up being sold or leased to other carriers. Otherwise, by filing for bankruptcy, 
the reality is that The Chapter 11 procedure is very pro-debtor making it difficult for creditors 
Sources: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, F41 
Schedule, P12 data; US DOT Form 41 via BTS, 
schedule T2.  
 
Note: Block Hour Utilization is a capacity measure 
given by the average number of hours each plane 
is on service, per day, typically determined from 
the time the aircraft leaves and arrives at the gate.
 
Graph 4 | US Airlines Average Daily Block 
Hour Utilization vs US Airlines Scheduled 
Revenue (in $ Billions) 
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to seize assets and liquidate the company. Therefore, generally airlines keep the business 
under enforced operations.  
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) are, on other hand, the standard industry measure for 
demand (often times called traffic), largely driven by macro factors, just as before. Between 
1995 and 2018, while the number of passengers emplaned in the US airlines increased from 
470.9 mln to 728.9 mln, growing at a CAGR of 1.9%, the RPM CAGR was 2.9% implying a 
greater average stage length (which, in fact, increased 320 miles between 1995 and 2018 to 
1,159 miles). Despite the significant growth evolution that RPMs yielded by US airlines show, 
there were several periods of recession during this period, which were always coupled with 
global recessions at the macroeconomic level, such as the Dot-com Bubble, in the early 
2000’s, and the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis. However, demand for air travel quickly returned 
to pre crises levels, showing a sharp growth in the years following the abovementioned crises: 
5.5% CAGR between 2003 and 2007 and 3.3% CAGR since 2009 until 2018, more than the 
growth in capacity (i.e. ASM) during both periods, which was 3.3% and 2.9%, respectively. At 
the same time, the airline is a highly cyclical industry concerning its RPM performance, with a 
stronger emphasis in the summer months (i.e. June, July and August), as can be seen in 
Graph 6. However, traffic tends to be modest between September and February, dipping in 
the begging of the year. This has a somewhat big effect on the quarterly results, as the second 
and third quarter tend to achieve higher PRASM and, consequently, higher profitability 
margins, while the first quarter tends to be underwhelming in the company’s overall results. 
What Do Passengers Value When Choosing An Airline? At this level the first thing to bear 
in mind is the current segmentation in travel passengers: business travel passengers and 
leisure travel passengers. This is the basis for airlines to set up their target passengers and 
not only develop its strategic positioning, but also developing the logistic of operations in order 
to be able to provide the service each type of passenger is expecting. In general terms, based 
on the more recent Airlines for America Air Travelers in America Ipsos Survey 1, passengers 
choose the airline they fly evaluating 3 core factors: price, scheduling and reliability. 
 






Major driver in the decision process, as they are much more 
price sensitive, showing some flexibility to change booking 
dates or even different holidays destination if travel price is 
more competitive.  
Flight experience, service and in-flight amenities are valued by 










Typically, they look for flights at the beginning or at the end 
of day, to avoid wasting “useful” daytime in airports when in 
holidays. 
Important factor in the decision as the majority of the flights these 
individuals take are in business and, very often, during their 
workdays to attend meetings, or something similar. Hence, 







 Regardless of the type of traveler, this is an equally relevant factor, as no one likes to wait for a number of hours. Therefore, 
airlines with better operating standards (i.e. on-time performance (OTP), flight cancellations rate (FCR), baggage mishandling, 
etc.) tend to attract more passengers and build a broader platform of frequent flyers. 
[Note: Further detailed analysis on US airlines Reliability performance on Competitive Landscape section] 
1 Air Travelers in America - Findings of a 
Survey Conducted by Ipsos (for further can 
by consulted at https://www.airlines.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/A4A-
AirTravelSurvey-20Feb2018-FINAL.pdf ) 
Sources: US DOT Form 41 via BTS, schedule T2
  
Graph 5 | US Airlines Annual RPM 
Performance versus Historical Economic 
Crisis Events 
Sources: Bureau of Transportation Statistics T-
100 Segment data  
 
Graph 6 | US Airlines RPM Monthly 
Seasonality, 2016-2019 
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Notwithstanding, the preceding segmentation is somehow “too simplistic” given the diversity 
that exists within the air travel demand. Business Travel and Leisure Travel, as presented 
above, are but two extremes that might be found in air passengers, but amongst them are 
several passengers segments that have a diverse set of needs and look for different products. 
Taking that into consideration, in the previous decades airlines have relied on the unbundling 
of fares, by separating the basic air transportation service fare from the additional needs a 
passenger may have (often called ancillary revenues, such as additional baggage, seat 
selection, on-board amenities, etc.). This business approach was adopted early on by low-
cost carriers, allowing them to significantly increase their market share and providing 
sustainability to their business model. Due to this disruption, legacy carriers found themselves 
in need of an alternative strategy to capture-back their market share, as they could not simply 
replicate low-cost’s approach since it would lead to a strategic positioning misperception in the 
passenger perspective. Recent developments on the industry, as expressed in the 
Counterpoint Market Intelligence 2018 Aircraft Interiors Report, revealed significant 
investment in premium economy seats cabin, a concept that began to gain relevance and 
popularity around 2000 with British Airways launching this service on its long-haul routes 
(though they already existed, at least since the early 1990’s). Afterwards, with the increasing 
gap between the value proposition of business class and economy class, there was a window 
of opportunity for airlines to explore further segmentation of its travel classes between these 
two. This is where premium economy comes in and it, not only brings increased supply 
segmentation to address passenger needs in a flexible manner (from the business strategy 
point-of-view), but it also brings enhanced abilities to work towards the per flight profitability, 
since it allows airlines to charge 80% higher fares versus traditional economy seats, as 
reported by Financial Times1 (in an in-house research article). In the last 4 years, premium 
economy grew at a 5% CARGR and is expected to grow at 9% until 2028. 
Industry Overview 
▪ A Critical Economic Engine For Global Travel & Tourism 
In 2018, according to World Travel & Tourism Council, global Travel & Tourism (T&T) sector 
grew by 3.9% and contributed to a record 10.4% of the world’s economic output, becoming 
the 5th biggest contributor to global GDP, behind Retail, Health, Financial Services and 
Construction. Still, T&T was the sector expanding the quickest, ahead of Automotive 
Manufacturing (3.7%) and Health (3.3%), and at higher rate than the global economy for the 
8th year in a row (3.9% versus 3.2%). Robust growth in T&T is mainly driven by the rise in the 
number of middle-class households, solid growth in global consumer spending, low 
unemployment rates and easier credit facility for consumption, driven by low interest rates. 
Comparing with 2017, a growth of 7.2% in the T&T sector directly contributed to $2.751bln 
(3.2%) of global GDP. The airline’s 60% weight in T&T reflects the industry’s economic 
importance. In terms of direct contribution to employment, in 2018, T&T supported around 
3.85% of total employment. Looking at the US economy, in 2018, T&T grew 2.2% (versus 
1 ‘Why airlines are rushing to add premium 
economy seats?’, in FT News (for further can 
by consulted at 
https://www.ft.com/content/41866d20-11f3-
11ea-a225-db2f231cfeae?sharetype=blocked)  
Note: The “mid-income” group is defined by 
population share with household disposable 
income between 75% and 200% of the national 
median. 
Sources: OECD  
Graph 6 | Middle-Class Households, as of 
April 2019 
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2.9% US GDP growth) and drove close 7.8% of US GDP. In employment terms, T&T 
represented 9.2% of US total jobs. According to A4A, US airlines’ employees earn up to +47% 
higher wages than the average private sector employee. 
▪ Industry Economic Performance 
In 2018, unlike the decelerating growth in traditional industries and sectors that have 
historically driven the global economy (such as manufacturing and mining), air transportation 
activity has remained constant in its growth. The increasing globalization, coupled with 
unprecedented flow of people and goods, provided airlines with growth opportunities across 
several markets. Proof of this is the growth in the number of unique city-pairs, which according 
to IATA increased 18.5% (from roughly from 18,000 to 21,000), between 2018 and 2014. This 
provided the basis for the $812bln revenues, by system-wide global commercial airlines, in 
2018, up from $755bln in 2017, with a CAGR of 1.44% since 2014. In 2019, the Industry’s 
Economic Performance Update, from IATA, showed weaker results than the projections 
advanced in the forecast dated of June this year. This below-expectations performance 
comes in line with a global GDP growth 0.2p p.p. below June forecasts (2.5% versus 2.7%) 
and world trade growth of just 0.9% (down from 2.5% forecasted in June). This global 
economic cool down contributed to the slowdown of passenger and cargo demand growth 
(3.7% versus 6.9% and -3.2% versus 2.9% in 2019 and 2018, respectively). Consequently, 
this led to smaller revenue growth with passenger yields decreasing 3.0% and cargo yields 
decreasing by 5.0% compared to last year. This led to a real decrease in revenue for the cargo 
segment (-8.1%) while passenger revenue still rose 1.1% to $567bln, up from $561bln in 
2018. Likewise, OPEX growth was below expectations, with a YoY increase of just 3.8%, 
below the 7.4% forecasted in June and less 6 p.p. than the YoY change verified in 2018, 
largely driven by the lower-than-expected fuel costs. Slower economic growth verified in 2019 
is largely owed to the current trade wars (US-China and the milder US-EU), geopolitical 
tensions and social unrest (Hong Kong, Venezuela, Chile, etc.), coupled with uncertainty over 
Brexit, which marked the year and created tougher business environment for airlines.  
In the aerospace industry, for the US aircraft manufacturer Boeing, 2019 emerged as one of 
the toughest years the company has faced, with the forced grounding of its 737 MAX model, 
after crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia, allowing Airbus to assume the leading position in the 
industry. This event, affected not only Boeing’s economic performance but also the airline’s 
that saw an unexpected disruption in its supply capacity, such as AAL, UAL and LUV, with a 
capacity reduction between 1 and 2% from its original +5% expectation, before the 737 MAX 
issues. However, 2019 was not dissatisfactory for all airlines, as is exemplified by SAVE, ALK 
and DAL that saw stronger 2019 Q2 demand. Still in the topic of Global Commercial Aircraft 
Manufacturers, it is important to mention that most recently, the industry’s market share 
structure has verified some relevant changes with the arising of new players. Historically, 
Boeing and Airbus have been dominating the market, but the growing demand for new 
aircrafts above production capabilities from the two manufacturing giants, left a window of 
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System  
Graph 7 | YTD Effective Federal Funds Rate 
vs US Consumer Credit Outstanding (in $ 
Billions) 
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opportunity for other players such as Embraer, ATR and Bombardier to try and meet the 
demand. At the same time, COMAC, the Chinese state-owned producer of CRJ and ARJ 
models, shows intentions of expanding its presence. With increased competition, a price 
pressure is expected benefiting airlines. However, part of COMAC aircraft models do not have 
the necessary certification and licensing from FAA and EASA, to operate in the US or EU, 
therefore a reduction in prices is only expected to be see in the long term. 
▪ Industry Financial Performance 
In terms of traffic and capacity, Pacific-Asia, as well as other emerging markets are growing 
at a faster pace than North America (NA). However, in terms of financial performance and 
profitability of operations, US airlines lead with larger revenue and profits compared to their 
international peers. Since the end of the last decade, NA airlines have been going through a 
process of restructuring and consolidation, which is now paying dividends. This can be 
highlighted by the shift that occurred in 2013 when NA airlines obtained higher ROIC than 
WACC, leading the overall industry to a green zone of value creation for investors. This was 
the result from consolidation and low fuel prices. In the remaining global regions, only 
European airlines have a WACC below ROIC (achieved 2 years after NA), largely driven by 
the contribution of LCC (e.g., Ryanair, easyJet, Wizz!) focusing on cost management and 
ancillaries. In contrast, Pacific-Asia and Latin America (LatAm) airlines deliver below-WACC 
return, due to the fierce market competitiveness (namely from NA and European foreign 
carriers), constraining airlines from fully passthrough the increased costs to costumers leading 
to narrower margins. At the same time, in particularly for LatAm airlines, managing the 
mismatch between their revenue settlement currencies and the large component of costs 
denominated in USD is another issue, resulting in an adverse impact by FX fluctuations.  
According to IATA, in 2019FY, NA airlines are expected to deliver $16.9bln net profit 
representing a net margin of 6.4%, compared to 5.7% in 2018. Likewise, operating margin is 
also expected to improve compared to last year, up from 9.1% to 9.6%. EU airlines, despite 
of the 1.5 p.p. decrease on their EBIT margin, down to 4.7%, are also expected to deliver 
profits with a net margin of 3.0% (translating in $6.2bln in net profit versus $9.1bln, in 2018). 
Pacific-Asia airlines have an expected net profit of $4.9bln (1.9% net margin) and an EBIT 
close to 3.5%. The remaining global regions are expected to deliver net losses, with the Middle 
Eastern region posing a net loss of -$1.5bln, as airlines in the region are under a process of 
restructuring 1. Africa is struggling to achieve adequate load factors making it harder generate 
better operating margins (~1%) and therefore deliver profits. LatAm airlines, saw the region's 
economy decelerate to a growth of just 0.2%, mainly due to the Argentinian recession and the 
Venezuelan economic crisis, declining the country’s economy by roughly 33%.   
Industry Outlook 
▪ Major Advanced Economies Weighing On Global Macro Slowdown 
1 namely at the capacity level (e.g., Fly 
Emirates cancelled part of its A380 backlog 
orders with Airbus) 
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IATA forecasts a global GDP expansion of 2.7% in 2020 (above 2.5% in 2019). S&P Global 
Ratings, on its Transportation Industry Top Trends 2020 release, is more optimistic and 
expects 3.3% for 2020, in line with IMF projections (3.4%). However, major advanced 
economies, according to the IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2019), are set for a 
slowdown, with the Euro area growing 1.4%, China 5.8% and USA 2.1%, with a 33% 
probability of falling into a recession, according to S&P Global Ratings. IATA expects global 
trade to grow 3.3%, following the recent developments towards a deal to smooth effects of 
US-China trade war, that is seen as very likely to happen given that 2020 poses as election 
year in the USA meaning “increased pressure to reduced trade tensions” 1. IATA also refers 
to measures led by central banks and fiscal policy easing by government as promoters for 
global economic growth. IMF’s long-run forecast points to a global GDP and USA growth of 
3.6 and 1.6%, in 2024, respectively. In the US economy, macro indicators reveal an inflation 
rate of 2.3%, relatively stable from 2020 onwards, though below world’s average of 3.5% until 
2024, according to the IMF. With regards to the disposable income per capita, US Bureau of 
Labour Statistics and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (Department of Commerce), 
expect an increase of almost 2.4% in 2020 – a growth expected to remain in the long-term, 
though at a slower pace (2.2% in 2024). This increase in disposable income per capita will be 
driven significantly by record low unemployment, which is expected to increase from 3.5% to 
3.9%, from 2020 to 2024 (compared to the 4.9% average in the last 5 years). Coupling this 
with lower interest rates (which were subject to 3 down cuts in 2019 and with no immediate 
prospects of an increase in the near future), it is likely that in the next years household 
consumption expenditure keeps the growing trend (i.e., 4.4% and 5.1%. in 2017 and 2018, 
respectively, according to OECD). This is expected to continue in the long run at an average 
4.1% CAGR, according to the same organization. With regards to T&T, WTTC foresees the 
sector to grow at a 3.6% CAGR, representing 3.5% of global GDP in 2039. This will be 
supported by increases in emerging market’s demand and generic nourishing macro 
conditions on the consumer and service sectors seen as major promoters for the expected 
growth in passenger demand for air travel. In the US, until 2029, T&T’s contribution to GDP is 
expected to grow at a 2.6% CAGR, above the 2.2% growth verified in 2018.  
▪ What To Expect From Airlines Industry For 2020? 
Early in 2019, fears over recession were one of the top concerns for the airline industry, given 
the indications of a potential slowdown of the global economy and several airlines’ bankruptcy 
events that have occurred throughout the year. These fears were then coupled with the B-
737 MAX crashes that enforced the grounding of the model, representing at the time ~1% of 
global fleet capacity. However, for 2020 IATA’s sentiment seems to be more bullish.  
Revenue & Profitability. Revenues will keep being fueled by consumers spending around 
1% of global GDP on air travel (same of 2018 and 2019); coupling this with the improvement 
in forecasted growth of global GDP (2.7% compared to the previous year’s 2.5%) and higher 
global trade growth (3.3% versus 0.9%), it is expected to yield a YoY revenue growth of 4%, 
1 In fact, the USA and China have agreed on 
a limited trade agreement in order to 
deescalate tensions, further signifying a 
possibility of a more comprehensive 
agreement later on, which would have a 
significant impact on the global trade and, 
more importantly for the report, a significant 
impact on the revenues of the major airlines 
[Note: Graph 8 show macroeconomic indicators 
projections included in the valuation model that 
support this equity research report] 
 
Sources: OECD (US – Real GDP Growth), IMF 
(US – Inflation), US Bureau of Labour Statistics 
and US Bureau of Economic Analysis (US – 
Disposable Income per Capita) 
Graph 8 | Real GDP Growth, Inflation And 
Disposable Income per Capita Forecasts for 
US economy until 2038 
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expected to close on $872bln. For IATA, this would ultimately result in a forecasted overall 
$29.3bln net profit for the industry (13.1% higher than in 2019), driven by increases in Europe, 
Pacific-Asia and, especially, LatAm, a region that is expected to deliver positive net results of 
$0.1bln, after 2 years of losses. North American region will continue yielding twice the net profit 
of other markets. Though, it is expected to decrease $0.4bln, down to $16.5bln. In terms of 
operating profitability, it is expected to improve its EBIT margin set to grow 0.4 p.p., to 5.5%. 
North America is still the most profitable market, while the remaining markets are on track to 
deliver better EBIT margin performance than the previous year. 
Traffic & Supply. Concerning the fundamentals for air travel sustainability, that is to say 
“demand”, IATA’s outlook is positive, though not that encouraging when looking at the past 5 
years. The global number of passengers is expected to grow by 4% (more 0.3 p.p. than in 
2019) and ASMs’ by as much as 4.7%, a significant improvement comparing to 2018’s growth 
of 3.5%, but far from the 6.7% average YoY growth of the last 5 years. NA market is expected 
to see an ASM growth of 5.1%, more 2.8 p.p. than in  2019 and the highest increase since 
2014. Furthermore, Europe is predicted to be the only market growing slower than in 2019. In 
terms of traffic the picture is similar, with global RPMs growth expected to remain its 2019 
behavior, of 4.1% YoY change, below the 7.3% average annual RPM growth that was verified 
in the last 5 years. 
Jet Fuel & Cost Structure. Jet Fuel costs is expected to keep decreasing as the market for 
fuel products is over-supplied. At the same time, the long-term trend for demand of these 
products is also expected to decrease given the increase in refinery’s fuel stockpiles, 
increasing concern on environmental issues and energy alternatives. Other factors 
counterbalancing this might be: i) Fuel price volatility – the uncertainty about the US, Saudi 
Arabia and Iran’s relationship, for instance, might lead to some price uncertainty; and ii) the 
IMO2020 environmental regulations concerning the shipping of fuel products, set to be 
introduced during 2020Q1. This let traders and buyers wondering about possibility that such 
regulations would have on the fuel prices pushing them higher. On the other hand, in a 
decreasing or flat fuel prices scenario, the rising of other non-fuel costs, such as labor costs, 
are seen as one of the major operational challenges. 
B-737 MAX Return. Another question for 2020 is when the grounded 737 MAX aircraft will 
return to service. The grounding of the Boeing jet model, despite having a nefarious impact 
for several airlines, has also promoted the improvement of load factors to record levels. After 
a number of postponements of regulatory approvals from the FAA for the comeback of the 
aircraft, at the end of 2019 both LUV and AAL announced the grounding B-737 MAX fleet 
until at least April 2020, 1-month more than planned, which will lead to the cancellation of close 
to 140 flights per day. The additional delay is likely to put pressure on LUV and AAL’s results, 
particularly in the first quarter of 2020, a period during which Delta is expected to yield better 
financial results and further improved stock performance. 
 
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.                             
EQUITY RESEARCH - COMPANY REPORT 
JANUARY 3RD, 2020   
 
 




Fleet Sizing & Renewal To Continue. The improvements in ROIC, particularly in North 
America and Europe, offered airlines the confidence capital availability invested in fleet 
transformation. New deliveries made last year focused on replacing aircrafts that were 
reaching their economic useful life expectancy, especially in the US where the average age 
of fleet is higher than that of the rest of the world. Notwithstanding, other factors are also at 
hand, namely the climate impact associated with the activity, which is a hot topic for European 
airlines that show commitments to accelerate retirements. However, in the US, transformation 
is largely driven by the financial moat of marginal unit cost reduction through increased 
efficiency in fuel consumption. Still with regards to cost efficiency improvement, airlines are 
wagering on smaller to midsize aircrafts, which are more flexible to adjust for seasonality as 
an attempt to increase load factors and reduce unit costs. This is well illustrated by the decision 
Airbus disclosed in February 2019 to cease the A380 superjumbo programme, just after Fly 
Emirates reduced its outstanding orders of 53 new aircrafts to only 14. The A380 aircraft has 
capacity to board up to 850 passengers and will be somewhat replaced by the new A350 
model, with a capacity of just 350 passengers.  
According to Airbus’ Global Market Forecast 2019-203, roughly 39,210 aircrafts are expected 
to be delivered in the next 20 years while fleet in service is forecasted to more than double. 
From these, around 36% are expected to replace aircrafts and the remaining 64% to increase 
capacity. In the same report, Airbus forecasts a larger demand for smaller aircrafts, as narrow-
body segment accounts for more than 3/4 of new aircraft deliveries, while wide-body aircrafts 
will only comprise 10% of deliveries (largely to the Middle Eastern region). At the same time 
NA is expected to absorb 17% of the world’s capacity increase, with smaller aircrafts models 
the highest in demand (82%). In other regions, Pacific-Asia is seen as the epicenter of airline 
industry growth for the next decades, capturing 42% of new aircraft deliveries, more than US 
and Europe combined (at 39%). Noteworthy is that a larger replacement rate is expected in 
NA airlines in comparison with its international peers. With a replacement rate of 55% in NA, 
only in Europe and LatAm show comparable numbers, with an expected replacement rate of 
45% and 43%, respectively. In Pacific-Asia, with only 25% replacement rate, airline’s focus is 
on scaling up activity. The higher replacement rate in NA is not only driven by the fact that the 
industry is consolidated, but also the average age of fleet is higher. Concerning the US airlines 
in the end of 2018, average fleet age was 5.22 years above its international peers. Delta Air 
Lines, highlighted in the Graph 12, has one of the oldest fleets amongst the group. However, 
the company is transforming its fleet to better adjust the demand specificities of the markets it 
serves by replacing the aircraft with more efficient next-generation aircrafts. During 2019Q2 
Delta has committed to accelerating the retirement of its 94 MD-90 and MD-88 (average age 
of 22.4 and 28.7, respectively) fleet until the end of 2022, approximately 2 years earlier than 
initially planned.  
Lastly, according to IATA the sustained fuel efficiency gains, from the fleet transformation, 
have offset CO2 emissions from increasing air transport services, as in a non-fleet renewal 
Sources: Global Market Forecast 2019-2038, by 
Airbus 
Graph 11 | (Airbus) Fleet In Service CAGR 
And Aircraft Replacement Rate 2019-2038 – 
Geographical Distribution 
Sources: Global Market Forecast 2019-2038, by 
Airbus 
Graph 9 | (Airbus) New Aircraft Deliveries 
2019-2038 – Geographical Distribution 
Sources: Global Market Forecast 2019-2038, by 
Airbus 
Graph 10 | (Airbus) New Aircraft Deliveries 
And Aircraft Replacements 2019-2038 – 
Geographical Distribution 
Sources: Bloomberg, DAL’s SEC Filings 
Graph 12 | Average Age Of Fleet – 
Comparison (US Airlines, International 
Airlines And DAL) 
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scenario the underlying fuel efficiency gains, fuel burn and CO2 emissions would be 1.9% 
higher in 2019. That amounts to savings on fuel up to $3.2 bln. However, airlines are expected 
to keep facing pressure to reduce their CO2 emissions. Therefore, improvements in fuel 
efficiency are expected to continue (up to -30% fuel per seat, in the case of A321XLR) given 
the higher portion of new-gen aircrafts in service in the next years. According to IATA’s 
outlook, fuel consumption will increase by 2.3% in 2020, while ASMs and the number of 
aircrafts in service will grow 4.7% and 5.3%, respectively - in 2018, it was evident the impact 
of the introduction of new more-efficient planes, with fuel consumption rising by 5.2%, while 
ASMs and aircraft fleet grew by 6.9% and 4.4%, respectively.  
Value Creation. Although there is a non-questionable need for fleet restructuration and 
increasing capacity, the bulk of investments made might weigh down 2020 cash flows, under 
a bearish scenario where traffic falls short to the expectations. This is relevant since as shown 
by S&P Global Ratings, on its Transportation Industry Top Trends 2020 release, aggressive 
growth, driven by misstep investments in capacity, has led to airline bankruptcies in the past, 
namely in Europe. Ultimately, given the considerable airlines’ investment completed and yet 
to be made throughout 2020, especially in fleet transformation, as well as the financial results 
that are foreseen to be obtained, only NA (9.1% ROIC) and European (7.7% ROIC) airlines 
will create value for their shareholders, given that in LatAm (5.2% ROIC) and Pacific-Asia 
(4.5% ROIC), airline’s WACC will remain above ROIC. In 2020, global airlines’ ROIC is 
expected to remain at 6%, which is also below WACC (~7%).  
Brexit, how relevant it is for US airlines? Results from recent elections in the UK, brought 
some certainty as it is now more likely that UK will effectively leave EU by the end of January 
2020. With regards to the airlines industry, UK and EU repeatedly ensured that flights will 
continue “as normal as possible” in a post-Brexit scenario. In September 2019, they updated 
the temporary air services agreement until October 2020 in order to allow flights between them 
in a no-deal scenario. However, there are expected short-term disruptions. On top of this, the 
potential GBP depreciation versus the other major currencies would positively impact UK’s 
inbound tourism. Coupling it all together, Brexit’s effect is keen to have mixed results on the 
UK’s airline industry. On the impacts the Brexit might have for US airlines, namely for Delta, 
there is a possibility for upsides as UK travelers that used to spend their holiday’s in the EU, 
especially in southern-Europe, might choose different destinations due to increased costs and 
bureaucracy. This means that there is a significant chance of UK travelers searching for new 
regions for their holidays, namely southern-US regions (such as Miami), or South America, 
and for which US airlines, or their partner carries in the region, may take advantage. Delta can 
leverage its London-US routes and capitalize JV’s and Equity Investments with LatAm partner 
airlines (discussed in detail further on). However, the downsides of a scenario under which 
the British economy collapses and, consequently, affect the wealth of consumers should not 
be disregarded as it would impact demand for air travel and negatively affect US airlines.   
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 Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
Company Profile  
Headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia (GA), United States, Delta Air Lines, Inc. was founded 
in 1924. With over $ 40 billion in revenues and employing over 88 thousand people, Delta 
Air Lines, Inc. provides scheduled air transportation for passengers and cargo over a 
network of routes in the US and across the world. The company's major segments include 
air transportation and refinery. Its route network is centered in 16 worldwide hubs with 
connectivity to key airports across several regions. Additionally, Delta also operates 
through international JV’s, alliances with foreign airlines, membership in SkyTeam and 
agreements with multiple domestic regional carriers that operate as Delta Connection. 
The Company also provides aircraft MRO services; vacation packages to third-party 
consumers, as well as charter/private jet services, and management programs/services. 
The Refinery segment consists of jet fuel and other refined petroleum products.  
Shareholder Structure 
Delta’s shareholder structure follows that of the rest of airlines trading in the United States, 
where major investors are Investment Advisors. According to Bloomberg as of December 
1st, 2019, these held 81.5% of Delta´s floating stock. The second biggest investor are Hedge 
fund managers, that held 8.9%, next up are several banks, that held 3.3%, pension funds 
held 2.9%, and lastly, insurance companies and sovereign wealth funds, both having held 
below 2% of Delta’s available floating stock (1.1% and 0.9%, respectively). The last 1.4% 
were held by other investors. In terms of individual investors, the largest investors were 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc (11.0%), Vanguard Group Inc (7.1%), BlackRock Inc (5.3%) and 
PRIMECAP Management Co (4.4%). Concerning the country of origin of the holders, most 
of the shareholders were from the USA, where 85.2% of the stock was held, the rest is 
spread throughout the UK (5.7%), Canada (2.1%), Luxembourg (1.2%) and several other 
countries. A further analysis about the type of fund that holds Delta’s stock shows that 
blended funds (i.e., funds that target both growth and value stocks) hold the largest part of 
the floating shares (30.3%). Next are the Growth funds (i.e., funds investing in stocks with 
low dividend pay-out, but large market capitalization growth potential) (18.5%), Value funds 
(i.e., funds that invest in undervalued stocks) (17.9%), ETF’s (i.e., funds that hold basket of 
stocks in order to simulate market performance) (15.8%). The rest are held by a diversified 
set of funds that include Asset allocation and Country funds. The type of funds that hold the 
stock implies that the largest Delta investor’s base believe the market to be undervaluing the 
stock, as the majority of the floating shares’ holders invest in undervalued or high growth 
potential stocks. 
Strategy & Business Model 
Delta Air Lines is a major passenger airline, providing worldwide air transportation service for 
passengers and cargo in a single-route-scheduling system. With an in-service fleet of 1,353 
Graph 13 | Delta’s Fund Shareholders by Type 
Sources: Own Development 
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aircrafts (910 in the mainline fleet and 443 from regional partners) and 350+ destinations, 
Delta has its network based in 16 hubs distributed across several key markets (9 in the US, 3 
in Europe, 2 in LatAm and 2 in Pacific-Asia), however Atlanta still serves as a main hub for 
Delta’s activity. Breaking down the destinations by geographic regions, 58% of the locations 
that Delta  flies to are in the domestic market (comprising USA and Canada), 19% of the 
destinations are located in LatAm (comprising the other countries in the American continent), 
18% are located in the Atlantic region (i.e., EMEA region), while the remaining 8% of 
destinations are located in the Pacific region. With regards to passenger revenue Delta breaks 
down in two ways, by geography and by type of ticket sold. Looking at the geographic division, 
domestic passenger revenues comprise most of Delta’s revenues (70.8%), followed by the 
Atlantic (15.5%), LatAm (7.3%) and, finally, Pacific (6.4%). Further detail on each regional 
market performance can be found in the next section. Analyzing by type of ticket sold, 53% of 
is derived from tickets sold to the main cabin, 35% from premium tickets, loyalty travel awards 
comprise a further 7% and travel related services the remaining 5%. Delta shows exceptional 
commitment to deliver its passenger a distinct travelling experience, not only on board, but 
also through all the touchpoints with its customers, using a retail-oriented, merchandised 
approach to distribution with well-defined and diversified products to its passengers.  
To support its activity and enhance its network connections (namely in the Domestic market) 
Delta uses regional partner carriers, operating on its behalf: Endeavor Air (Delta’s subsidiary), 
SkyWest Airlines, Compass Airlines, Republic Airways and GoJet Airlines. However, previous 
years’ numbers suggest that Delta is reducing its dependence on regional partners, as their 
contribution for system capacity has shrunk by 3 p.p., down from 13.8% in 2013 to 10.8% in 
2018. Likewise, regional partners contribution for total passenger revenue has diminished, 
representing only 16.6% in 2018FY, down from 18.8% in 2016. Representing about 33% of 
total fleet in service, as of the end of September this year, regional partner carriers provided 
9.9% of additional capacity accounting for 15.6% of Domestic capacity. This traduces to 
14.3% of total passenger revenue, or 19.9% when considering the Domestic market’s 
passenger revenue. Throughout the 2020’sFY, this trend is expected to stabilize in line with 
the number figures of 2019FY. DAL also has some codesharing agreements with third-parties 
allowing the company to extend its operations without further investment. These agreements 
are comprised in the Delta’s Connection program and/or in long-term strategic alliance with 
SkyTeam (despite Delta’s management talking about lack of value of the alliance).  
Delta’s other revenue can be grouped in 3 subsets: Ancillary Business, Loyalty and 
Miscellaneous (e.g., lounge access fees and codeshare). From these activities, Ancillary 
Business deserves particular attention, it includes: i) Refinery Activity, performed by Monroe 
Energy, LLC., supplying almost 80% of Delta’s jet fuel needs, effectively a hedge tool for fuel 
prices exposure, which has significantly impacted the fuel price per gallon that Delta ultimately 
supports (to be discussed in deeper detail on Final Valuation Considerations appendix 1); and 
ii) the MRO Operations by Delta TechOps, (in-house services and third-parties) for which may 
1 please refer to ‘The Value Of Monroe Energy, 
LLC For Delta Air Lines, Inc. Amid A Bearish 
Fuel Outlook’ appendix 
Graph 14 | Delta Revenue Segmentation By 
Type Of Ticket Sold, 2016 vs 2018 
Note: The inner circle stands for 2016 and the outer 
one for 2018 
 
Sources: Delta Air Lines, Inc. SEC Filings 
Sources: Delta Air Lines, Inc. SEC Filings 
Graph 15 | Delta Air Lines Fleet And  
Regional Carriers Contribution, as of 
September 2019 
Sources: Own Development 
Figure 1 | Delta Air Lines Activity Segments 
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exist a good runway of opportunity, due to the expansion in commercial aviation industry 
reflecting on the MRO market. In fact, according to Global Fleet & MRO Market Forecast 
Commentary 2019–2029, by Oliver Wyman, in the US, MRO market is expected to grow at 
1.1% CAGR, until 2024, and 2.5% CAGR between 2024 and 2029, with the slower initial 
growth driven by the rising number of new-generation aircraft. Lastly, in December 2018, Delta 
sold DGS, LLC (DAL Global Services) that provides aviation-related services, to Argenbright 
Holdings, LLC. The transaction yielded $40 million in cash and a 49% non-controlling interest. 
Still, DGS’s operations are expected to remain unchanged, as well as the services the 
company used to provide under Delta’s ownership. A later event to highlight is its partnership 
with Wheels Up to launch one of the world’s largest private jet fleets, in a deal to be settled in 
early 2020 (the financial terms undisclosed). Still, following Ed Bastian’s (DAL’s CEO) mid-
December speech, where he said that “Delta Private Jets was somewhat shadowed under 
Delta’s umbrella and was never able to attract the type of sales and marketing dollars needed 
to create a separate platform”, suggests a further equity-stake sale of Delta’s private jet 
branch.  
Geographic Segmentation Analysis 
A further in-depth analysis was conducted with regards to the regions Delta operates in, as 
well as comparing several common industry metrics. The metrics analyzed are the region’s 
total revenues, the region’s passenger revenues (that include both mainline and regional 
revenues), RPM 1, ASM 2, PRASM 3, RASM 4, Passenger Mile Yield 5 and Load Factor 6.  
▪ Domestic (North America) 
Delta’s capacity metrics in the domestic market have been improving considerably, achieving 
higher growths when compared to the whole of Delta’s airline segment. In fact, it has improved 
its total revenues at a CAGR of 6.9% in the last two years, while its passenger revenues have 
grown at a 6.1% CAGR in the same period. This was the result of an increase in RPM of 4.0% 
and ASM 3.9% annually. Delta has also been able to slightly increase its high load factor from 
85.3% in 2016 to 85.5% in 2018, comparable to the industry average, according to FAA, of 
85.3% in 2016 and 2018. When analyzing the global domestic market, its ASM grew 3.0% in 
the last 2 years, lower than the 7.8% between 2013 and 2016. This was the result of two large 
improvements in 2015 (where the market grew 11.9%) and 2016 (growing by 8.7%). While 
the capacity and traffic meters have allowed Delta to consolidate its growth, PRASM has only 
grown on average 2.1% and RASM 2.9%, which is only slightly higher than the cumulative 
inflation of 2.3% in the last two years. In fact, looking at Delta’s mile yield, it has not been able 
to increase more than the real rate of inflation, as the CAGR was only 2.0%. By analyzing the 
market share, a probable answer can be found to why these operational metrics have not 
been growing at a healthy rate, in fact Delta’s market share has been squeezed by other 
competitors, after achieving a market share in 2014 of 21.2%, in 2016 Delta’s market share 
was just 20.3% and in 2018 19.8%. In this region, Southwest is the undisputed leader with 
more than 27.3% market share in the domestic market. Even with the decrease in recent 
1RPM: Revenue passenger miles, a metric of 
traffic; calculated as the number of passengers 
considering distance travelled; 2ASM: Available 
Seat Miles, a metric of capacity calculated as 
the total number of seats considering distance 
travelled; 3PRASM: Airline’s passenger revenue 
per ASM; 4RASM: Airline’s total revenue per 
ASM; 5Passenger Mile Yield: Airline’s revenue 
transporting one passenger one mile; 6Load 
Factor: calculated dividing RPM’s by ASM, a 
metric to determine how much at capacity each 
aircraft is on average when performing a flight. 
Sources: Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
(Airport Data) 
Figure 2 | Delta Air Lines’ Market Share of 
Passenger by US Hub, as of September 2019 
Hubs Legend: Atlanta, GA: Hartsfield-Jackson 
Atlanta International (ATL); Boston, MA: Logan 
International (BOS); Minneapolis, MN: 
Minneapolis-St Paul International (MSP); Salt Lake 
City, UT: Salt Lake City International (SLC); Detroit, 
MI: Detroit Metro Wayne County (DTW); New York, 
NY: John F. Kennedy International (JFK); New 
York, NY: LaGuardia (LGA); Seattle, WA: 
Seattle/Tacoma International (SEA); Los Angeles, 
CA: Los Angeles International (LAX); Miami, FL: 
Miami International (MIA); Washington, DC: 
Ronald Reagan Washington National (DCA); San 
Francisco, CA: San Francisco International (SFO); 
Las Vegas, NV: McCarran International (LAS) 
 
Note: Hubs in red stand for Delta’s US Domestic 
Hubs, while hubs in blue are other relevant US 
airports in which Delta also have a significant share  
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years, Delta remains in second place, ahead of American with 18.7% of the capacity of the 
flights performed in the domestic market, while United is currently fourth place (13%). The 
biggest winner in this market in the past two years has been Alaska, having grown from 3.9% 
in 2016 to 5.2% in 2018. At the same time, American has performed the worst with a market 
share decrease of 1.2% since 2016. However, this decrease has been recent, as by 
considering the period between 2013 and 2018, it was the biggest winner increasing its 
market share by almost 4%. Southwest has also lost more than 3% over the past 5 years in 
market share. Analyzing by type of airline, LCC are, yet again, the ones suffering the most, 
losing 4.2% of market share in the last 5 years, down from 44.9% in 2013 to 40.7% in 2018. 
Both Network Carriers and ULCC have capitalized on this lost, with the first gaining 1.8% 
market share to 51.4% in 2018 and the latter rising by 2.4% in the last 5 years to 7.9% in 2018. 
▪ International 
Delta’s international flights have followed an inverse path from that of the Domestic flights. 
While its international revenues grew by 4.3% from 2016 to 2018 and its passenger revenues 
3.6%, its RPM has only grown 0.8% and its ASM has decreased at a -0.4% CAGR. Coupling 
with Delta’s PRASM growth of 4.0% and RASM 4.7%, while mile yield has grown only 2.7% 
(however, larger than the inflation rate, opposite of the Domestic market) implying a focus in 
“quality rather than quantity” of destinations provided. In fact, this can also be observed in the 
load factor, up from 83.5% in 2016 to 85.6% in 2018, 4 p.p. higher compared to the industry 
average of 80.7% in 2016 and 81.5% in 2018, according to the FAA. The overall market has 
performed well in the past years growing at a CAGR of 5.0% between 2013 and 2018, 
however a lower CAGR of just 2.4% since 2016. 
The focus in higher revenue per flight has impacted the company’s market share, decreasing 
from 23.0% in 2016 to 22.0% in 2018. Delta is currently trailing American with a market share 
of 29.5% and United with a market share of 24.5%, however it is ahead of such players as 
JetBlue (10.8%) and Southwest (6.2%). In the last 2 years both leading players have been 
suffering, with American and United losing both between 1.4 and 1.5%, while Southwest has 
gained almost 2% in the last couple years. At the same time, looking at the market share since 
2014, Southwest has been the biggest winner since it did not have international flights in 2013, 
only having started to fly them in 2014. JetBlue was the second-best performing player in this 
market accumulating an extra 2.2% of market share in the last 5 years. In the international 
market, Network Carriers have suffered, losing 8.4% of the market share from 2013 to 2018, 
this was the result of LCC’s growth outside the domestic market (with Southwest leading this 
expansion). In fact, these gained 7.9% of market share in the international market, reaching 
20.2%, behind Network Carriers’ market share of 76.0%. At the same time ULCC gained 
0.6% of the market, reaching 3.8% market share, up from 3.2% in 2013. 
Atlantic 
The Atlantic segment of Delta’s network has been a boost for growth in the last couple of 






















Graph 16 | Delta’s Operational Metrics 
Performance (in cents) 
















































Sources: Delta Air Lines, Inc. SEC Filings 
Graph 18 | Domestic Market Share by Type 








Note: The inner circle stands for 2013 and the 
outer one for 2018 
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CAGR of 7.3% in the last two years, while its passenger revenues grew 6.7%. At the same 
time, while its capacity of flights did not have a very strong growth when compared with 
Domestic, for instance (a CAGR of 1.5%, which is however still the only non-negative 
international segment), its RPM have grown by 4.3% in the last couple of years, representing 
a strong focus on better management of routes. At the same time, Delta’s PRASM and RASM 
have grown well above the global average of 3.0% and 3.8%, by growing at 5.1 and 5.7%. 
Also load factors expanded to 85.3% in 2018, up from 80.7% in 2016, well above the Atlantic’s 
global average of 81.0%. It should be noted that the global Atlantic market has been unable 
to expand since 2016 with an ASM CAGR of just 0.3% between 2016 and 2018.  
When it comes to the market conditions, this is a market where only three players offer 
destinations. Delta is the current market leader with 36.5% market share, followed by United 
at 35.4% and American with 28.0%. During the past 2 years, Delta has expanded to become 
the leader of this market surpassing United in 2017. In fact, while in 2013 United was the 
leader with more than 42.4% of market share, Delta only had 37.8%. However, the biggest 
winner in the last 5 years has been American, which has ‘stolen’ most of United’s market 
share increasing from 19.8% in 2013. Since the network carriers are the only one present in 
this market, a further analysis by the type of carrier is not possible for this market. 
LatAm 
Delta’s revenues in the LatAm market have followed the trend of the international flights in the 
past 2 years, having grown only 4% when considering the total revenues and 3.7% when 
taking into account passenger revenues. At the same time, Delta’s RPM have grown 0.7% in 
the past 2 years, while its ASM grew 0.2%. Coupling this small growth with the fact that its 
PRASM has grown 3.5% and RASM 3.8% shows a focus in the most profitable destinations. 
In the past two years, Delta’s passenger mile yield for this market has grown 3.0% and its load 
factor 0.5%, further substantiating the previous hypothesis. At the same time, the region has 
presented itself with strong growth, with its ASM expanding with a CAGR of 7.5% between 
2013 and 2018, 4.2% between 2016 and 2018, well above Delta’s ASM increase of just 0.2%. 
The biggest player in this market, leading by a wide margin, is American with 32.0% of the 
capacity of flights performed to this region. Afterwards is United, with 17.4%, Delta 16.9% 
(down from 17.1% in 2016 and 17.2% in 2013), JetBlue, with 15.9% and Southwest with 
9.0%. Yet again, the biggest winner in this market was Southwest gaining more than 2.6% in 
market share in the last two years (and all of its 9.0% of market share in the previous 5 years). 
American, while still in first place by a wide margin, has lost more than 3% in market share in 
the past 2 years (5.3% when considering the 5-year range) and United lost 1.2% in the last 
couple of years (4.3% in the last 5 years). Network carrier airlines in the LatAm have suffered 
heavily from the expansion of LCC. In fact, while they controlled 76.2% of the market in 2013, 
in 2018 they only controlled 66.3%; at the same time LCC carrier increased their market share 
from 18.4% to 28.2%. Lastly, Ultra Low-Cost carriers have been unable to make strong gains 








Graph 21 | International Market Share by 
Type of Carrier, in 2013 and 2018 
Note: The inner circle stands for 2013 and the 
outer one for 2018 
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Graph 20 | Major Player’s International 
Market Evolution 
Sources: Bureau of Transportation Statistics - Air 
Carrier Traffic Statistics (Green Book) 
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Delta’s performance in the pacific region has been poor in the past years. It has seen its total 
revenues decrease by 1.7% and its passenger revenues decrease by 3.1%. At the same time 
its RPM has decreased by 5.5% and it’s ASM 4.6%. Delta’s PRASM has grown 1.6%, less 
than the inflation over the same period. Delta’s RASM has also increased 3.0%, lower than 
the average increase of 3.8% and its load factor has decreased from 87.7% to 86.2%, the 
only region where this happened. The only component of the pacific region that did not 
decrease or grew less than the average was the passenger mile yield, which grew an average 
of 2.5%. The low performance was probably the cause of the trade war between the Trump 
administration and China. In fact, when analyzing the market as a whole, it has contracted 
3.7% in the last 2 years. On top of this, in the last 5 years only in 2016 did it grow, a growth of 
just 1.1%, compared with a negative CAGR in the last 5 years of 2.1%. In August, 2019, Delta 
has announced the transfer of its US-Tokyo routes from Narita to Haneda airport, following its 
plans to reshape its business in the region, which comprises replacement of B-747-400 
aircraft with the new A350-900 with increased premium seat capacity. It is, therefore, expected 
improvements in yields and consequently profitability in Pacific-Asia routes. 
In the market, Delta faces limited competition of 3 American players. The largest of these is 
United that captures 48.7% of the market share, followed by Delta (25.7%), American (16.1%) 
and Hawaiian (9.1%). Delta’s performance in this market over the past years has also suffered 
heavily, boasted 37.2% market share in 2013 and 31.6% in 2016 which shows a steady 
decline over the years. At the same time, United’s has remained relatively stable (registering 
a market share of 47.1% and 48.1% in 2013 and 2016, respectively) and American has been 
making strong gains in this market, up from 8.3% market share in 2013 (13.6% in 2016) to 
the current 16.5%. Hawaiian has been largely unable to capitalize its position in the central of 
the region only improving its market share of 6.7% in 2016 to the current 9.1%. In this market, 
the LCC (through Hawaiian) have been able to gain some market share, though limited, 
increasing just 1.8% between 2013 and 2018, currently just 9.1%. Which means that, like the 
Atlantic market, Network carriers dominate this market (with a market share of 90.9%). 
Geographic Segmentation Analysis Bottom Line 
While Delta has been able to increase all its operational metrics, it has been unable to expand 
greatly than the market, representing lower market share and a resulting loss to the 
competitors. At the same time, while nationally, network carriers have been able to withstand 
the increasing pressure from LCC, in the LatAm market, Delta, American and United have 
suffered heavily from the investment made by airlines offering services guided towards a 
value-based offering. Continuing with the analysis, Ultra Low-Cost carriers have been unable 
to make the significant gains made by its peers in the European market, due to the different 
type of passengers as well as a different history in the American market. In fact, while they 
have achieved a stronger presence in all markets they operate in, ULCC have only gained 














































Graph 22 | Major Player’s International 
Market Evolution 
Sources: Bureau of Transportation Statistics - Air 






Graph 23 | Global ASMs Market Share by 
Type of Carrier, in 2013 and 2018 
Sources: Bureau of Transportation Statistics - Air 
Carrier Traffic Statistics (Green Book) 
 
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.                             
EQUITY RESEARCH - COMPANY REPORT 
JANUARY 3RD, 2020   
 
 




market however. While none of these Ultra Low-Cost airlines have been able to stand out, all 
of them have increased their market presence in the last two years, though by small margins.  
Competitive Landscape 
The Airline’s Industry is one of the most competitive industries around the world. Various 
strategic approaches are adopted by companies in an attempt to differentiate themselves 
among one another. The Industry can therefore be segmented in 3 strategic positioning 
concepts (vide Figure 3): Network Carries (NC, or Legacy Carriers), Low-Cost Carriers (LCC) 
and Ultra Low-Cost Carriers (ULCC). This segmentation aims to group airline carriers 
reflecting their business model similarities and their operational and financial features.  NC 
typically generate above-average unit revenues coupled with a higher cost structure (i.e., 
higher TRASM and CASM), as they support their value proposition by providing superior 
travel experience to the customer in a full-service basis. From an operational point-of-view NC 
tend to show significant international presence across major global regions. On the other 
hand, LCC and ULLC are more value-for-the-money oriented, presenting lower TRASM and 
CASM. In terms of marginal operating profits per ASM (MASM), what can be seen is that NC 
yield higher MASM (i.e., group average of $1.68/ASM, with Delta outperforming the whole 
industry with $2.56/ASM), followed by LCC and ULCC ($1.62/ASM and $1.31/ASM, 
respectively). Considering the TTM as of September 2109 (vide Graph 25), 73% of the US 
airlines’ Total Operating Revenue was generated by NC, and 22.7% and 4.2% were delivered 
by LLC and ULCC, respectively. In terms of Domestic Revenue, the picture is more level-
headed, with Network Carriers controlling more than 66% of Revenues stake, LLC delivering 
28% of revenue and ULCC a residual 5.3% stake. Internationally, NC have more than 90% 
of the Revenue, with LCC and ULCC yielded less than 8.5% combined.  
▪ Flying High With The World’s Most Valuable Airline 
Based on the 2019 Brand Finance Airlines 50, Delta Air Lines, Inc. increased its brand value 
16% compared and is now the world’s most valuable airline, with $10.1bln of brand valuation. 
Furthermore, it should be noted the fact that the top 4 brands are US based, and that one of 
them (Southwest) recorded the highest value increase (i.e., 24.5%). Contributing to brand 
value record is Delta’s value proposition offering a distinct experience enabling passengers to 
choose among its travel classes, namely Delta One TM, Delta Premium Select, First Class and 
Delta Comfort+ TM. All include varying premium amenities and services – while Main Cabin 
and Basic Economy allow varying levels of pre-travel flexibility and some on-board service. 
However, what seems to contribute to the superior brand value of Delta is the SkyMiles ® 
loyalty program. In its partnership with AMEX it provides greater incentives for its members to 
fly with Delta and its regional partners, earning mileage credit for travel awards that can also 
be earned in certain services offered by program participants, such as hotels and rent-a-car 
agencies. Its SkyMiles loyalty program was, in fact, considered the #2 Best Airline Rewards 
Programs in 2019-20, by the U.S. News & World Report, with an overall score of 4.18 out of 
5, only behind Alaska’s 4.62. This recognition was largely driven by superior network 
Sources: Bureau of Transportation Statistics (F41 
Schedule P12 data, T-100 Segment data) 
Graph 24 | CASM-TRASM Relationship, by 
NC, LCC and ULCC, as of September 2019 
Sources: Airline Economic Analysis 2018-2019, 
by Oliver Wyman 
Figure 3 | US Airlines Segmentation 
Sources: Bureau of Transportation Statistics (F41 
Schedule P12 data, T-100 Segment data) 
Graph 25 | Distribution of Operating 
Revenue and RPMs by NC, LCC and ULCC, 
as of September 2019 
Sources: Brand Finance (Brandiretory) 
Figure 4 | Airlines 50 2019 Ranking 
Report (Top 5) 
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coverage, additional benefits, airline quality (based on service provided, on-time performance, 
consumer complaint rate, mishandled baggage rate, etc.) and frequeny of daily flights 
(+3,000, only exceeded by Southwest). Additionally, Delta was also recognized for the 9th 
consecutive time as the Best Corporate Travel Airline in US (by BTN’s Airline Survey), with 
an overall score of 4.39 out 5, demonstrating the superior service that Delta aims to provide 
its customers. Ultimately, it supports one of the greatest competitive advantages: the capacity 
to attract frequent flyer passengers, such as coporate travellers that make up a significant 
portion of the revenue by paying higher fares and flying more frequently, reducing the 
revenue’s seasonality. Resiliency and a reliability of operations is also a striving factor for many 
airlines in order to achieve profitability, especially in an increasing complexity and segmented 
demand. Contributing to the Delta’s brand recognition is its operating reliability performance. 
This is assessed by through 2 indicators: On-time Performance (OTP) (flights that arrived or 
departed no more than 15 minutes later than scheduled) and Flight Cancellation Rate (FCR). 
US airlines’ OTP averaged 80.3% over the last 5 years. Hawaiian is consistently the top 
performer, followed by Delta that has been consolidating its OTP performance (85.3%, on 
average), while Alaska has been continuously worsening its performance. With regards to 
FCR, US airlines historical performance shows that 2017 was the worst year with, on average, 
1.4 in 100 flights cancelled. Contributing to this weak performance were JetBlue and Spirit, 
with FCRs of 2.8% and 3.3%, respectively. Delta shows performance improvement 
consistency, with a ratio equal to that of Hawaiian’s 0.2% in 2019 (down from 1% in 2017).  
In 2018, 8.2% of revenue miles flown on Delta were from award travel, as program members 
redeemed more than 17.2 million, 9% of these derived from SkyMiles. Total cash sales from 
marketing agreements related to the loyalty program increased more than 19% from the 9 
months ended September 30 in 2019, reaching $3.1bln. In spite of this, loyalty program 
revenue, recorded in “Other Revenue”, only accounts for $1,4bln and $1,1bln in the 3Q 2019 
and 2018, respectively. In the future, Delta’s SkyMiles Loyalty Program revenue is expected 
to grow more than 30% in 2020, compared to the level in 2018. 
▪ JV’s And Equity Investments, A Global Airlines Chess Match 
In the last decade, legacy carriers, such as Delta Air Lines, United, Qatar Airways and Etihad 
Airways, have been acquiring minority interest acquisition in other airlines, in order to enhance 
their global presence. Beyond traditional regional and codeshare partners, Delta has been 
building a number of Joint-Ventures (JV) and Equity Investment Participations across the 
globe. In fact, by the end of 2019Q3, Delta held more than $2,5bln in equity participations in 
other companies. In North America, these include West Jet (joint business agreement), 
Republic Airways (17% equity interest reported at $176mln), Alclear Holdings LLC (7% equity 
interest reported at $29mln) and AirCo (formerly DGS, 49% equity interest reported at 
$123mln). In Europe, these encompass Virgin Atlantic (~$3bln JV, 49% equity interest 
reported at $393mln), Air France-KLM (~$11bln JV, 9% equity interest reported at $393mln) 
and Alitalia (JV with shared frequent flyer benefits) 1. In Pacific-Asia these incorporate China 
Sources: U.S. News & World Report 
Figure 5 | 2019-20 Best Airline Rewards 
Programs 
Sources: Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
Carries Snapshot 
Graph 26 | Major US Airlines On-Time-
Performance (OTP), 2015-2019 (as 
November) 
Sources: Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
Carries Snapshot 
Graph 27 | Major US Airlines Flight 
Cancellation Rate (FCR), 2015-2019 (as of 
November) 
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Eastern (3% equity interest recorded at $226mln), Korean Air (~3bln JV, 10% equity interest 
recorded at $134mln) and Virgin Australia (JV). Lastly, in LatAm these comprise Aeroméxico 
(~$1bln JV, 51% non-controlling equity interest recorded at $843mln), GOL (9% equity 
interest recorded at $256mln) 2 and, lastly, LATAM (not yet concluded, but an agreement has 
been reached in September 2019 pending approval for a JV and code sharing agreement). 
Despite Delta’s long list of investments, LATAM can be considered the “game changer”. It 
could be the biggest airline acquisition in the US market since the notorious consolidation 
period, during the last decade, which began with Delta merging with Northwest (2008) and 
“ended” with the Virgin America merger into Alaska this past year. The advantages derived 
from the deal for both airlines are Delta’s expectations of an additional $1bln revenue over the 
next 5 years, which seems to be achievable given: i) the existing synergies and the 
complementarity of operations and routes, which will make Delta and LATAM hold a 
combined leading position in 5 out of the top 6 LatAm markets, with departures from US (i.e., 
Chile, Brazil, Peru, Argentina and Ecuador); ii) the sharing of frequent flyer and miles program; 
iii) the current stake Delta has in Aeroméxico which is planned to be operationally leveraged 
with the increased presence in the LatAm market; and iv) the fact that US-LatAm routes 
generate $8bln in revenues each year, out of which $1.6bln is captured by LATAM. 
Furthermore, this deal may have some implications across a considerable part of the industry. 
In fact, there might be a significant level of losers. These are, but not exclusive to, American 
Airlines (JV between LATAM and American is expected to be terminated), OneWolrd Alliance 
(by LATAM exiting this alliance), SkyTeam (Delta’s alliance, through Delta’s concerted effort 
of investment in other airlines, side-lining the alliance; at the same time, there is no indication 
of LATAM joining), GOL (through Delta’s sale of its participation), Alaska Airlines (an end to 
the current partnership with LATAM is predictable), IAG (a possible partnership with LATAM 
was studied, though it is no longer expected with Delta’s anticipation) and Qatar (which 
currently has a 10% stake in LATAM, but will lose influence to Delta that will acquire a 
participation double that of the Qatari airline). However, at the time of announcement of the 
deal, due to the disclosed deal’s financial conditions, Delta’s investor base seemed concerned 
with the large premium (>80%), and with the high transaction multiples, EV/Revenue (1.00x 
vs 0.57x) and EV/EBITDA (5.13x vs 6.46x). However, as the deal will be financed with 
available FCF and debt (a $900mln Sr Secured Bond due in 2024 with no material impact on 
its leverage ratios by credit rating agencies) and because Delta is outmaneuvering its 
competitors, investors are expected to be more bullish (despite short-term detriment of FCF). 
Values Drivers Boosting Performance 
Diversity of “in” and “out-borders” JV’s and Equity Investments, allowing the company 
to improve and consolidate its leadership position, especially in the growing markets. 
Ancillary Business and value stream provided by the vertical integrated business model 
allowing the reduction of costs and increase profitability. Refinery has a relevant role by 
offsetting the fuel prices risk exposure and reduce the average costs per gallon, as reviewed 
in more detail in Final Valuation Considerations appendix 1.Operational Excellence 
1 With the ongoing industry consolidation in 
Europe, a number of sizeable airlines ceasing 
operations and/or going bankrupt during the 
last years (such as Thomas Cook, Aigle Azur, 
XL Airways…), Alitalia went into financial 
distress. The Italian government has been 
continuously extending the investment 
timeframe for contender airlines to present 
their bid and take over the flag carrier. Delta, 
having a JBA in course with Alitalia (a former 
partnership through SkyTeam) made a bid of 
$112mln for 10% equity interest. However, a 
few months ago Lufthansa bid doubled Delta’s 
amount, and is now on track to win the deal. 
This can dictate the end of the relationship 
between Delta and Alitalia, as well as for 
SkyTeam that would see Alitalia migrate to 
Star Alliance (Lufthansa’s membership 
strategic alliance).  
2 As result of its announced strategic alliance 
with LATAM, Delta will exit its partnership with 
GOL. It is expected to sell its stake, as well as 
the shutdown of the existing joint commercial 
agreements. 
1 please refer to ‘The Value Of Monroe Energy, 
LLC For Delta Air Lines, Inc. Amid A Bearish 
Fuel Outlook’ appendix 
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Standards established by Delta provides a competitive advantage in the sense that 
customers recognize the reliability of Delta’s services and its underlying superior value added, 
allowing it to explore this customer value perception, increasing revenues and consolidating 
its position in Premium Products. Delta’s balanced capital allocation strategy must also be 
mentioned. It includes the strong cash flow generation capacity and above-average Financial 
Results (cumulatively, revenue growth and margin improvement). Additionally, high discipline 
on business reinvestment, namely in fleet renewal (by 2023, ~35% of mainline fleet). 
Risk Drivers Ahead 
By investing in Delta’s stock, one should be aware that there are several risks associated with 
the airline industry. One of the biggest risks is the fuel price, since airlines are highly dependent 
on fuel prices, which is the most volatile cost present in their operations. While these have 
been low as of lately, compared with historical levels, there is no guarantee that the associated 
costs will remain at this level in the long term. A sensitivity analysis was made with regards to 
this risk, and more information can be found further. It should be noted, however, that Delta 
controls Monroe Energy LLC, its wholly owned refinery subsidiary that provides the company 
most of its fuel needs. The refinery segment is used by Delta as a hedge against this risk. At 
the same time, the company still makes use of hedging financial instruments to mitigate some 
of the volatility associated with the oil commodity. Another risk is the possibility that some of 
the companies with which Delta currently has a joint venture or an investment goes into 
financial distress. Delta has begun investing more and more in these agreements and has 
started to move away from global alliances and is therefore more exposed to this type of risk. 
Another risk associated with investing in the airline industry is the risk that governments 
impose stricter regulations concerning air pollution. Currently transportation along with 
resource extraction are some of the biggest sources of pollution, and therefore there is a risk 
that governments restrict in some unforeseen way the normal operations of the company or 
its source of fuel. Another risk facing, not only the company, but also the industry is the 
increasing possibility of a recession. Historically, in a recession, airlines tend to be one of the 
most affected industries (though more so in Europe when compared to the USA due to the 
type of passenger and consolidation of the industry). A further analysis on the impact of 
recessions in airlines can found in Final Valuation Considerations appendix 1. Other prevalent 
risks with investing in Delta are exchange risks as the stock is traded in US Dollars (though 
that can be mitigated by hedging). There is also a risk with the exchange rate risk associated 
with Delta, as some of their expenses are denominated in currencies other than the US Dollar. 
A risk of terrorist attacks, similar to the one perpetrated in September 2001, where, for 
example, the DJUSAR Index (an US airline index) lost 46% of its value in a single week, 
between 14 and 21 of September of 2001. However, the governments have imposed stricter 
measures so that this can be avoided, and therefore the risk is reduced at the moment. Other 
possible risks that are inherent of the airline industry are the possibility of stronger presence 
by low and ultra-low cost carriers, which are already present in the American market, but have 
been unable to make the same gains as others have made in Europe. Possible reputational 
1 please refer to ‘Returns And Betas: Status Of 
The Airline Industry’ appendix 
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damage because of an improper action by one of Delta’s employees; a possible rise in 
insurance costs; an increase in union power; a possible increase in the tax rate and a risk of 
rising interest rates are also prevalent when investing in the airline’s stock. 
Financial Analysis 
Past Performce: Financial Ratios Analysis 
Activity Ratios: Increase in Average Collection Period (ACP) outpaced by significant 
increase in Average Payable Period (APP) yielded ~4 days improvement in Cash Conversion 
Cycle (CCC), from 2016 to 2019Q3. Overall CCC is better than industry average, as of 
2019Q3 (-26.5 vs -19.1 days). Since 2016, CCC was negative, suggesting low risk and low 
pressure on liquidity. Liquidity Ratio: These have decreased since 2016, especially the cash 
ratio that is half that of 2016’s level (0.18 vs 0.09 in 2019Q3). This means that Delta is more 
dependent on its ability to liquidate its current assets to fulfil its current liabilities, presenting a 
higher executional risk. Despite possible “red flags”, the company’s current assets are the 
most homogeneous in terms of liquidity amongst the group. While the Industry averaged a 
differential of 0.53 between the Current and the Cash ratios, DAL’s stood at 0.28. DAL’s 
liquidity condition has deteriorated during the analysis. However, one should bear in mind the 
strong CAPEX level and its above average FCF. Profitability Ratios: Since 2016, profitability 
from operations showed a downward trend, both for EBITDA and EBIT margins, due to 
significant increase in expenses related to Profit Sharing, Labor, Fuel and accelerated 
depreciations (more so in 2019). Net margin has increased since 2017, supported by gains 
on its equity investments. Nonetheless, even with the declining trend at the operational 
profitability level, DAL still yields profit margins above its peers’ average. Profitability From 
Investments Ratios: With a ROA above the overall industry peers average, DAL poses as 
one of the most asset efficient airlines amongst the comps group. ROE has been relatively 
stable, increasing since 2017 and averaging below its peers’. Ultimately, at the ROIC level, 
DAL outperforms the group, with an upward trend that fixed ROIC at the 20.9% high, in 2018, 
2x higher than its comps, enhancing the above-average ability that DAL has towards value 
creation. Capital Structure Ratios: DAL’s capital structure ratios are in line with the industry 
peers’ average. Still, the increasing gearing ratio should be highlighted, given that DAL is 
relying more on long-term debt as a way of financing, reflecting on D/E behavior in the last 
years, culminating in a 1.32 D/E. Likewise, Debt/EBITDA has also been increasing, meaning 
that debt level increase is outpacing earnings. Ultimately, DAL’s solvency condition and 
financial autonomy is slightly better peers’ group, and is only outperformed by its low-cost 
peers, which have significantly less debt on their capital structure than DAL.  
Investor’s Relations: Strong Stockholder’s Return 
During 2018, Delta distributed over $900 million to shareholders through dividends and 
$1,600 billion by buying back shares. Delta has a policy of distributing 70% of its FCF to 
shareholders, according to the 2018 Investor’s day presentation, where close to one third is 
Sources: Delta Air Lines, Inc. And Industry Peers’ 
SEC Filings 
Graph 30 | Profitability From Investments 
Ratios 
Sources: Delta Air Lines, Inc. And Industry Peers’ 
SEC Filings 
Graph 28 | Liquidity Ratios 
Sources: Delta Air Lines, Inc. And Industry Peers’ 
SEC Filings 
Graph 29 | Profitability Ratios 
Sources: Delta Air Lines, Inc. And Industry Peers’ 
SEC Filings 
Graph 31 | Capital Structure Ratios 
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distributed through dividends, and the remaining through a share repurchase program. At the 
same time, as part of Delta’s plan, it has been able to achieve a CAGR of total dividends in 
excess of 33% since 2013, according to data collected from Bloomberg. The strong focus 
from the management group in buying back shares implies a market undervaluation of the 
company in their view. When comparing Delta to its peers, it has had a larger FCF to Equity 
than any of its competitors, when accounting for both total dividends and share repurchases. 
At the same time Delta pays more dividends per share than its US peers. This is in part due 
to different strategies followed by its competitors. For example, United has a policy of not 
distributing dividends, opting instead to buy available floating shares in order to increase 
shareholder’s returns. To conclude, Delta shows a great commitment with stockholder’s 
return and welfare. In fact, to achieve this, since 2013 it has reduced its share count by more 
than 24% while keeping its Debt-to-EBITDAR ratio within the self-defined target range 1.5-
2.25. For future periods, stockholders’ return is expected to amount for 70% of the FCF.  
Forecasting 
BS Forecast 
Property, Plant and Equipment (PP&E) was forecasted using Delta’s decomposition in the 
financial statements, with Flight Equipment (projected based on the number of aircrafts) and 
Ground and Property Equipment (forecasted considering the investment made in La Guardia, 
LAX and expected future investment), the most relevant captions. The Operating lease right-
of-use assets was forecasted with consideration to the number of leased aircraft. Cash 
Restricted for Airport Construction was projected with the spending in the construction of the 
La Guardia Terminals as well as new bonds issued when the previous proceeds have been 
consumed. Loyalty program deferred revenue was estimated having into consideration the 
peers and Delta’s mileage credits earned and redeemed as a % of total RPM. With regards 
to the ‘Profit Sharing’ caption, its payment is only conducted in February of the next FY, 
therefore the value present in the Income Statement is also considered in the Balance Sheet. 
The last noteworthy caption to mention in Core Invested Capital are Long Term Investments, 
that comprise Equity Method Investments and Fair Value Investments; these have been 
adjusted for the participation in LATAM that will be valued at close to $2 billion in 2020 and the 
disinvestment in GOL in 2020FY, currently valued close to $250 million. Until 2029 there is no 
further investment estimated, but afterwards the caption has been considered to increase with 
passenger revenue due to Delta’s focus on these partnerships. With regards to the financial 
aspect of the company’s balance sheet, ‘Total Long-term debt’ was estimated with the current 
target of 1.5 to 2.25x EBITDAR. Note that, while Excess Cash has been forecasted to reach 
close to 30 billion in 2038, the authors are not expecting it to realize, as Delta would invest in 
other airline’s participation, in aircraft to rejuvenate it, distribute to shareholders through special 
dividends, invest in its pension plan, among other possibilities. 
 
Graph 32 | DAL’s Historical Free Cash 
Flow to Equity 
[Note: Return on equity presented as the total 
Dividends paid + Net repurchases divided by the 
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Below is a representation of the division of the revenues (note that the division subsequent to 
‘Mainline, By Geography’ have all been subdivided for each region, for example a different 
Load Factor, Miles Flown, Market Share, etc. was calculated for each region). 
The industry projections used are based on an annual report performed by the Federal 
Aviation Authority 1 (FAA), and the information with regards to the industry flights, market  
share, and other information related to the Cargo revenues, derived from reports compiled by 
the Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2 (BTS), the rest of the information was provided by 
Delta’s annual reports and Traffic releases. Apart from the forecasted market share, that 
accompanied the trend until 2024 and remained constant thereafter, the projected Passenger 
and Cargo revenues are based on the reports previously mentioned. With regards to Other 
Revenues, the loyalty program tended to the industry average as a % of RPM’s, the Ancillary 
revenue through a report compiled by Oliver Wyman 3 and, lastly, the Miscellaneous revenues 
(related with access to Delta Sky Club) grew at the inflation rate until 2024, and afterwards 
considered to grow at the same rate as the Passenger Revenues.  
Most of the operating costs forecast were based on Delta’s operations (be it through ASM, 
RPM or total Revenue). However, a closer look on Delta’s biggest costs and the analysis for 
their projection can be seen on the left. Some noteworthy mentions are the Salaries and 
Related Costs as an adjustment was made to consider the sale of DGS by Delta in the end 
of 2018FY, considering the 350 million in costs that will be moved to the ‘Contracted Services’ 
caption. With regards to Aircraft Fuel and Related Costs, while until 2023, projections were 
based on analysts’ projections of the fuel price, from 2023 onwards, due to lack of liquidity in 
the market, a % of revenues was considered. The caption ‘Contracted Services’, was 
projected to have a larger than normal increase in 2019 since, as mentioned previously, DGS 
costs that were encompassed in Salaries and Related Costs have been assigned to this 
caption. Lastly, the Profit Sharing has been projected based on Delta’s Pre-tax profit (which 
1 FAA Aerospace Forecast 2019-2039 
2 Air Carrier Traffic Statistics (Green Book) 
3 Airline Economic Analysis 2018-2019, by Oliver 
Wyman  
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Figure 7 | DAL’s Historical And Forecasted 
(Major) Operational Expenses 
Sources: Delta Air Lines, Inc. SEC Filings 
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includes not only the Core, but also the Non-core and Financing expenses, adjusted for some 
unmentioned costs in the annual report totaling close to $ 1.3 billion), with the costs related to 
the caption being 10% of the Pre-tax profit bellow 2.5 billion and 20% above it. Salaries and 
Related Costs are projected to have their weight on the overall costs increase due to the 
increasing power present in unions, resulting in them being able to negotiate better contracts 
for its members. ‘Aircraft Fuel and Related Costs’ have there are projected to decrease in total 
operating costs due to low oil prices and low market forecasts. 
Monroe Energy LLC 
Monroe Energy LLC (‘Monroe’) was acquired by Delta to hedge against rises in fuel prices, 
and due to its attempt at selling this part of the business in the past, it was considered as a 
non-core asset. With regards to the assets related to this enterprise, as information was only 
available for the total amount, the totality of the airline’s fuel inventory has been considered as 
part of the subsidiary (since this caption does not exist in other airline’s BS) and has been 
projected using the current production capacity of 200.000 barrels per day and the estimated 
fuel price. At the same time, using the information from Monroe’s peers 1, a gross PP&E has 
been estimated based on the ratio of gross fixed assets turnover that resulted in an amount 
for ground property and equipment, deducted from the value present in the Core Invested 
Capital’s PP&E, of close to $2 billion. The hedge position in fuel derivatives was also 
considered as it is conducted through its subsidiary. Lastly, another caption was considered 
with the missing values that oscillated between $180 and $250 mln between 2016 and 2018. 
These have been deducted from the captions ‘Other non-current Assets’ and ‘Other non-
current Liabilities’ and estimated to be constant throughout the forecasted years. 
With regards to the Monroe’s Income Statement, the revenue associated with sales to Delta 
have been considered in Delta’s core income statement as well, present at cost, as Delta 
would incur in these costs, if it were to sell the subsidiary. At the same time an agreement 
would likely be made, in case of the sale of Monroe, whereby it would continue to supply Delta 
at cost. With regards to total sales, that include third party sales and sales to the airline 
segment, these have been considered using a projection projected fuel cost. Furthermore, 
Delta mentions the Operating Income with regards to Monroe and using this margin and the 
sales performed in the past an operating margin of 2.18% and 1.06% has been reached, in 
2017 and 2018 respectively, a margin forecasted to remain constant until 2038. 
Valuation 
DCF Method & WACC Calculation 
The WACC was computed with the unlevered betas of Delta’s peers using the log returns 
from the last three years and the cost of debt of the most liquid long-term bond to unlever each 
peer’s beta, resulting in an unlevered beta of 0.81. Furthermore, the Market Risk Premium 
(MRP) was computed using the monthly historical total excess returns from the companies 
1 For this analysis, the peers considered 
were: Calumet Specialty Products Partners 
LP, CVR Refinery LP, HollyFrontier Corp and 
Delek US Holdings Inc 
WACC, or Weighted Average Cost of Capital, 
represents the average cost an enterprise 
has when financing its operations. It 
encompasses the company cost of equity, 
cost of debt, the company’s tax rate and its 
leverage ratio. 
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present in the S&P Index (SPTR500N ticker in Bloomberg), with the 10 year yield from US 
government bonds trading at the time used as a proxy for risk free, which resulted in a MRP 
of 6.1%. Using the CAPM model, the resulting cost of equity of Delta’s stock is 7.4%, (risk free 
used was 1.8%, US 10Y government bond’s yield in December 1st, 2019). This originated a 
WACC of 6.6% in 2020 and a 6.8% in 2038; the change is due to Delta’s different capital 
structure in 2020 and 2038. Using this WACC and a long-term growth of 1.8%, the resulting 
fair value for Delta’s share was $112.34 and an enterprise value of $90,054 (and a market 
capitalization of $72,655). It should be noted that as Monroe Energy LLC is considered non-
core, a different method was used than for the rest of Delta’s non-core assets. An EV/EBITDA 
multiple valuation was computed using Monroe’s currently traded comparable companies that 
resulted in an EV for Monroe of $1,011 million. 
Multiples Valuation 
Several different types of multiple’ ratios were used to compute the fair market value of Delta’s 
EV. They were calculated using the forward multiples computed from Delta’s peers (of which 
Air Canada is excluded due to it being traded in the Toronto stock exchange, a less liquid 
market than the S&P 500). Note that for the forward multiple, the general investor base’s 
expectation, present in the Bloomberg, for the projections in the FY2020 were used, including 
the investor’s projections for Delta to assess the forward multiples that Delta was trading. 
However, to compute the fair EV using the multiples, the forecasted projections were used. 
The multiples used were EV/Sales, EV/EBITDA, EV/EBITDAR and P/E (a summary table 
can be found in the annex). It should be noted that for the EV/EBITDAR, the Trailing Twelve 
Months (‘TTM’) was used due to lack of information in Bloomberg concerning analysts’ 
expectation. According to this analysis Delta is currently trading at lower multiples compared 
to its peers, apart from EV/Sales (where Delta is overvalued in the market by over 7%). 
Through this analysis, a fair market price of $ 70.55 was reached, that represents a premium 
currently to the current market price of 20%. Note that in this valuation, as the operations of 
Monroe Energy LLC are already included in the metrics used to compute the multiples, unlike 
in the DCF valuation, a separate valuation was not computed for this segment. This analysis 
further substantiates the hypothesis that Delta’s stock is currently undervalued in the market 
as the current stock’s market value is lower compared to its peers. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to assess the risks inherent in the projections, two sensitivity analysis were performed 
with regards to two metrics, that could heavily impact the share’s fair value: oil price and the 
Delta’s mainline market share – the output of this analysis can be found in the Appendix. 
Historically, the fuel prices have been very volatile, as can be seen in the Graph 36, and 
therefore a sensitivity analysis was made in order to estimate what impact it would have in the 
Delta’s final valuation. The scenarios chosen concern a possible flat price increase and 
decrease in the oil commodity price of 20%. The same analysis was conducted for the 
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Graph 35 | Multiples Valuation Output 
Sources: Own Development 
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would decrease Delta’s market cap in more than 32%, which shows the consequences this 
caption has on Delta’s value. At the same time a decrease of 20% in fuel price cost would 
increase Delta’s market value by over 32% as well. By looking at Delta’s market share, a 
decrease in 20% would impact Delta’s value in excess of 11%. The impact is not as large as 
expected since while Delta’s revenues would decrease, so would many of the costs 
associated with the decrease in the number of flights, as well as a decrease in the CAPEX, 
among other captions. Another analysis was made if Delta was impacted by both captions at 
the same time, and it resulted in a decrease of market capitalization in excess of 40% (for a 
20% increase in fuel cost and 20% decrease in market share), which would result in a fair 
share price $ 66.38, greater still than the current share price. If the opposite were true, this 
would result in a market capitalization in excess of 46%, which would result in a fair share price 
of $164.75. Further analysis were made with connection to changes in the long-term growth 
(standalone), unlevered beta and cost of debt. The long-term growth had a final range of doubt 
of 1.3% to 2.5%. This resulted in a final share price between $105.75 and $122.00. By 
analyzing the unlevered beta, the range of doubt used was related with the standard deviation 
of the betas calculated, while for the cost of debt current weighted average cost of debt was 
used (i.e. including the cost associated with financial and operating leases) and the current 
cost of financial debt (i.e., % of interest expense with regards to financial debt). This resulted 
in a final price between $223.98 and $61.39. All these analyses were made in a ceteris paribus 
world. More information can be found in Figure 8. 
Investment Recommendation 
The US airline industry is capital and labour intensive and has systematic components of risk 
tied to economic conditions being highly exposed to other exogeneous factors like the volatility 
in oil prices leading to a high volatility of returns. It was found that US airline stocks tend to 
trade on revenue momentum in the near term, and changes in unit revenues play a big part 
in investor sentiment and valuations. In recent years, NA airlines, in particular, have shown a 
fundamentally more stable and less cyclicality than in the past, largely due to consolidation of 
the industry. By investing in DAL, one should be aware of the risks associated with the 
industry, among them being the aforementioned fuel prices, global economic downturns, and 
regulation of the industry due to increasing concerns regarding pollution. On top of this and 
supporting the investment recommendation being advised in the report, it should be 
highlighted DAL’s management excellence under Ed Bastian, which has consistently 
performed above expectations driving higher returns to shareholders. Taking this into 
consideration, the upsides form the JV with LATAM are expected to be achieved. Additionially, 
the strong cash flow generation should be emphasized and its commitment to return value to 
shareholders. Ultimately, a strong buy is recommended due to a company’s undervaluation, 
both in relative terms, i.e., through the DCF analysis ($112.34) and compared to its American 
peers ($69.92). It should be noted that the price in December 1st, 2019, of $57.31 
representing a minimum expected return of 20%.  
Note, for the sensitivity analysis the upper fuel 
cost range (varying from roughly 67 and 71 
dollars per barrel) is similar to values 
transacted in the market historically. In fact, in 
September 2018, the commodity was trading 
at close to the upper fuel cost range. At the 
same time, the lower range (which ranged 
between 44 and 47 dollars per barrel) is close 
to the 3Y minimum price. With regards to 
Delta’s market share sensitivity analysis, its 
upper range of ~22% is close to DAL’s market 
share in 2013 of 21%, while its lower range of 
~15% would follow the opposite path of AAL’s 
past 4Y trend. 
Reinvestment Rate
10.30% 9.30% 8.30% 7.30% 6.30%
20.17% 110.27$ 107.92$ 105.75$ 
21.17% 111.29$ 108.75$ 106.41$ 
22.17% 118.63$ 115.34$ 112.34$ 109.60$ 107.09$ 
23.17% 120.27$ 116.68$ 113.43$ 
24.17% 122.00$ 118.08$ 114.56$ 
Price per share
RONIC
Figure 8 | Sensitivity Analysis 
Note, when RONIC is lower than expected, 
management would be expected to reinvest a 
lower amount in the operations, opting to 
distribute more to the company’s 
shareholders, and therefore this scenario was 
not considered. At the same time, a higher 
RONIC was not considered with lower RR as 
the management group would likely opt to 
invest more in the company as higher returns 
would be observed. 
It should be noted that as RONIC and 
Reinvestment Rate pertain to 2038, the 
analysis performed considered only small 
variations to assess the impact on the 
company’s fair value such a small variation 
would have. 
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Forward Looking Financial Statements: Income Statement 
(in millions) 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2029F 2034F
Core Business
Operating Revenue
Passenger 35,814$     36,947$     39,755$     42,261$     43,353$     44,504$     45,712$     47,002$     48,380$     57,802$     65,590$     
Cargo 684$          744$          865$          967$          1,068$       1,161$       1,239$       1,300$       1,340$       1,584$       1,953$       
Other 2,719$       2,945$       3,270$       3,738$       3,764$       3,794$       3,826$       3,861$       3,900$       4,386$       4,871$       
Total Operating Revenue 39,217$     40,636$     43,890$     46,965$     48,185$     49,459$     50,777$     52,163$     53,620$     63,772$     72,414$     
3.5% 3.1%
Operating Expense (30,981)$   (33,715)$   (37,120)$   (38,410)$   (38,745)$   (40,025)$   (41,506)$   (42,903)$   (44,424)$   (53,462)$   (62,263)$   
Salaries and related costs (9,394)$      (10,058)$   (10,743)$   (11,118)$   (11,466)$   (12,000)$   (12,565)$   (13,168)$   (13,814)$   (16,880)$   (20,716)$   
Aircraft fuel and related taxes (5,985)$      (6,756)$      (9,020)$      (8,562)$      (7,957)$      (8,112)$      (8,454)$      (8,685)$      (8,928)$      (10,618)$   (12,057)$   
Regional carriers expense, excluding fuel (3,447)$      (3,466)$      (3,438)$      (3,663)$      (3,814)$      (3,971)$      (4,131)$      (4,299)$      (4,474)$      (5,482)$      (6,475)$      
Depreciation and amortization (1,886)$      (2,205)$      (2,312)$      (2,718)$      (2,896)$      (3,039)$      (3,148)$      (3,223)$      (3,239)$      (3,705)$      (3,723)$      
Amortization of Identifiable intangibles, net of accumulated 
amortization
(17)$           (17)$           (17)$           (17)$           (17)$           (17)$           (17)$           (17)$           (17)$           (17)$           
Contracted services (1,918)$      (2,108)$      (2,175)$      (2,611)$      (2,693)$      (2,818)$      (2,950)$      (3,091)$      (3,240)$      (3,854)$      (4,376)$      
Passenger commissions and other selling expenses (1,484)$      (1,554)$      (1,674)$      (1,779)$      (1,824)$      (1,873)$      (1,924)$      (1,978)$      (2,036)$      (2,433)$      (2,760)$      
Advertising Costs (267)$         (273)$         (267)$         (304)$         (312)$         (320)$         (329)$         (338)$         (348)$         (415)$         (471)$         
Ancillary businesses and refinery (1,182)$      (1,495)$      (1,695)$      (1,533)$      (1,541)$      (1,536)$      (1,578)$      (1,608)$      (1,639)$      (1,909)$      (2,133)$      
Aircraft maintenance materials and outside repairs (1,434)$      (1,591)$      (1,575)$      (1,609)$      (1,575)$      (1,517)$      (1,458)$      (1,397)$      (1,432)$      (1,744)$      (2,130)$      
Passenger service (964)$         (1,123)$      (1,178)$      (1,233)$      (1,243)$      (1,255)$      (1,268)$      (1,284)$      (1,302)$      (1,418)$      (1,550)$      
Landing fees and other rents (1,472)$      (1,501)$      (1,662)$      (1,773)$      (1,848)$      (1,926)$      (2,006)$      (2,091)$      (2,180)$      (2,851)$      (3,348)$      
Aircraft rent (285)$         (351)$         (394)$         (415)$         (439)$         (459)$         (478)$         (493)$         (506)$         (616)$         (753)$         
Other (1,621)$      (1,609)$      (1,723)$      (1,882)$      (1,930)$      (1,981)$      (2,034)$      (2,090)$      (2,148)$      (2,555)$      (2,901)$      
Operating Lease Expense Adjustment for interest cost NA NA 249$          248$          253$          258$          264$          270$          271$          295$          323$          
Unrealized gain/(loss) on investments, net -$               -$               14$            -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               
Monroe Energy LLC third-parties sales related costs, adjustement 358$          392$          490$          557$          555$          540$          570$          588$          608$          739$          826$          
Core Result before Taxes, net of Profit Sharing 8,236$       6,921$       6,770$       8,555$       9,440$       9,433$       9,271$       9,260$       9,196$       10,310$     10,151$     
Profit sharing (1,115)$      (1,065)$      (1,301)$      (1,598)$      (1,766)$      (1,772)$      (1,748)$      (1,746)$      (1,734)$      (1,945)$      (1,914)$      
Core Result before Taxes 7,121$       5,856$       5,469$       6,957$       7,673$       7,661$       7,523$       7,514$       7,462$       8,365$       8,238$       
Adjusted Taxes (2,427)$      (2,420)$      (1,283)$      (1,632)$      (1,800)$      (1,797)$      (1,764)$      (1,762)$      (1,750)$      (1,962)$      (1,932)$      
Core Result, net of Other Comprehensive Income 4,694$       3,436$       4,186$       5,325$       5,873$       5,864$       5,758$       5,752$       5,712$       6,403$       6,305$       
Net Change in derivative Contracts 3$              (6)$             (4)$             -$           -$           -$           -$           -$           -$           -$           -$           
Net change in investments 36$            142$          -$               -$           -$           -$           -$           -$           -$           -$           -$           
Core Result 4,734$       3,572$       4,182$       5,325$       5,873$       5,864$       5,758$       5,752$       5,712$       6,403$       6,305$       
Non Core Business
Monroe Energy LLC (125)$         110$          58$            101$          101$          98$            103$          107$          110$          134$          150$          
Miscellaneous, net (255)$         (70)$           184$          (82)$           (109)$         (100)$         (100)$         (100)$         (101)$         (108)$         (116)$         
Non Core Result before Taxes (380)$         40$            242$          19$            (8)$             (2)$             3$              7$              10$            27$            34$            
Taxes 133$          (14)$           (51)$           (4)$             2$              0$              (1)$             (2)$             (2)$             (6)$             (8)$             
Net Change in derivative Contracts (40)$           (23)$           20$            -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               
Net change in pension and other benefits (360)$         (98)$           -$               177$          -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               
Non Core Result (647)$         (95)$           212$          192$          (6)$             (1)$             3$              5$              8$              20$            26$            
Financing
Interest Expense (388)$         (396)$         (311)$         (390)$         (400)$         (365)$         (321)$         (321)$         (319)$         (368)$         (347)$         
Finance Lease: Interest Expense (22)$           (30)$           (33)$           (36)$           (37)$           (39)$           (39)$           (48)$           (59)$           
Interest Expense, net (289)$         (360)$         (367)$         (329)$         (284)$         (282)$         (279)$         (320)$         (288)$         
Operating Lease Expense (249)$         (248)$         (253)$         (258)$         (264)$         (270)$         (271)$         (295)$         (323)$         
Financial Result before Taxes (388)$         (396)$         (560)$         (638)$         (652)$         (623)$         (585)$         (591)$         (589)$         (663)$         (669)$         
Tax Shields 136$          139$          118$          150$          153$          146$          137$          139$          138$          155$          157$          
Net Change in derivative Contracts -$               -$               (1)$             -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               
Financial Result (252)$         (257)$         (444)$         (488)$         (499)$         (477)$         (448)$         (452)$         (451)$         (507)$         (512)$         
Comprehensive Result 3,834 3,220 3,950 5,029 5,368 5,386 5,313 5,305 5,268 5,916 5,819
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Valuation: Multiples Approach 
  * Note:  
While values used to assess each peers’ multiple were based on the analysts’ consensus (i.e., according to Bloomberg), including the ones referring to DAL, the values 
presented as “Delta Air Lines Metric” are derived from the estimates from the model supporting this Equity Research (i.e., own estimates).  
Observation: 
Instead of presenting the financial statements as the company presents them, a reformulation of these was conducted. This was done in order to better understand the assets and 
liabilities and how they impact the operations of the company. In fact, the three divisions Core, Non-Core and Financial are to this point. The assets and liabilities present in the Core 
Invested Capital are assets that the company needs in order to operate “normally”. This means that if the company were to lose access to these, its operations would be otherwise 
disrupted. With relation to the Non-Core Invested Capital, these are the assets that the company has beyond its core operations. For this category are included, the Short-term 
investments as the company is not a financial one, and therefore could do without these type of investments, Pension, postretirement and related benefits and the assets related to 
Monroe Energy LLC since Delta has tried to sell the refinery in the past, and is therefore considered as non-core (or non-essential to the operations of the firm). Lastly, the financial 
side of the company is the way that it finances its operations, through outside support or through its own shareholders. 
Note:  
Operating leases only started being reported in 2018, therefore before are they were valued as 0 in the company’s financial statements. 
(in millions) 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2029F 2034F
INVESTED CAPITAL
Core Invested Capital
Property and equipment, net of accumulated depreciation and 
amortization
22,978$        25,054$        26,987$        31,380$        33,144$        34,703$        35,921$        36,806$        37,059$        42,210$        42,249$        
Operating lease right-of-use assets -$               -$               5,994$          6,058$          6,180$          6,311$          6,451$          6,604$          6,624$          7,217$          7,886$          
Goodwill 9,794$          9,794$          9,781$          9,781$          9,781$          9,781$          9,781$          9,781$          9,781$          9,781$          9,781$          
Identifiable intangibles, net of accumulated amortization 4,844$          4,847$          4,830$          4,813$          4,796$          4,779$          5,586$          5,569$          5,552$          5,716$          5,631$          
Cash restricted for airport construction -$               -$               1,136$          606$              252$              1,322$          968$              613$              259$              -$               -$               
Deferred income taxes, net 3,064$          1,354$          242$              -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               
Loyalty program deferred revenue (2,278)$         (3,559)$         (3,652)$         (3,835)$         (3,941)$         (4,027)$         (4,109)$         (4,203)$         (4,329)$         (5,300)$         (6,482)$         
Net Deferred Tax Asset -$               -$               (163)$            -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               
Other noncurrent assets and liabilities, net of amount allocated to 
Monroe Energy LLC
(406)$            (458)$            425$              425$              425$              425$              425$              425$              425$              425$              425$              
Other noncurrent assets 1,208$          1,507$          1,127$          1,649$          1,649$          1,649$          1,649$          1,649$          1,649$          1,649$          1,649$          
Other noncurrent liabilities (1,875)$         (2,197)$         (952)$            (1,378)$         (1,378)$         (1,378)$         (1,378)$         (1,378)$         (1,378)$         (1,378)$         (1,378)$         
Alocated to Monroe Energy LLC 261$              232$              250$              154$              154$              154$              154$              154$              154$              154$              154$              
Profit Sharing (1,115)$         (1,065)$         (1,301)$         (1,598)$         (1,766)$         (1,772)$         (1,748)$         (1,746)$         (1,734)$         (1,945)$         (1,914)$         
Restricted Cash 64$                39$                47$                107$              145$              97$                66$                107$              161$              387$              717$              
Long Term Investments 522$              1,793$          2,473$          2,573$          4,258$          4,258$          4,258$          4,258$          4,258$          4,258$          4,831$          
Hedge Position (Foreign Currency) 27$                (17)$               (3)$                 8$                  3$                  21$                -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               
Net Working Capital (7,257)$         (8,858)$         (8,253)$         (10,258)$       (10,665)$       (11,023)$       (11,407)$       (11,810)$       (12,259)$       (14,351)$       (17,018)$       
Operating Cash 1,389$          1,449$          1,565$          1,654$          1,697$          1,742$          1,788$          1,837$          1,888$          2,246$          2,550$          
Accounts receivable, net of an allowance for uncollectible accounts 2,064$          2,377$          2,314$          2,515$          2,580$          2,648$          2,719$          2,793$          2,871$          3,415$          3,878$          
Expendable parts and supplies inventories, net of na allowance for 
obsolescence
372$              413$              463$              437$              434$              425$              423$              418$              428$              508$              594$              
Air traffic liability (4,626)$         (4,364)$         (4,661)$         (4,973)$         (5,102)$         (5,237)$         (5,379)$         (5,531)$         (5,693)$         (6,802)$         (7,719)$         
Accounts payable (2,572)$         (3,634)$         (2,976)$         (4,028)$         (4,046)$         (4,174)$         (4,329)$         (4,478)$         (4,648)$         (5,120)$         (5,908)$         
Accrued salaries and related benefits (1,809)$         (1,957)$         (1,986)$         (2,120)$         (2,186)$         (2,288)$         (2,396)$         (2,511)$         (2,634)$         (3,218)$         (3,950)$         
Loyalty program deferred revenue (1,648)$         (2,762)$         (2,989)$         (3,057)$         (3,141)$         (3,210)$         (3,275)$         (3,350)$         (3,451)$         (4,224)$         (5,166)$         
Prepaid expenses and other 792$              781$              1,112$          976$              1,002$          1,026$          1,050$          1,076$          1,108$          1,343$          1,593$          
Other accrued liabilities (1,219)$         (1,161)$         (1,095)$         (1,662)$         (1,904)$         (1,955)$         (2,007)$         (2,065)$         (2,128)$         (2,498)$         (2,890)$         
Total Core Invested Capital 30,237$        28,924$        38,543$        40,060$        42,610$        44,874$        46,191$        46,403$        45,795$        48,396$        46,105$        
Non Core Invested Capital
Short-term investments 487$              825$              203$              -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               
Pension, postretirement and related benefits (13,378)$       (9,810)$         (9,163)$         (8,342)$         (9,912)$         (9,886)$         (9,874)$         (9,873)$         (9,796)$         (10,479)$       (11,626)$       
Monroe Energy LLC 1,331$          2,127$          1,705$          1,887$          1,844$          1,872$          1,876$          1,904$          1,933$          2,115$          2,281$          
Total Non Core Invested Capital (11,560)$       (6,858)$         (7,255)$         (6,455)$         (8,068)$         (8,014)$         (7,998)$         (7,970)$         (7,863)$         (8,363)$         (9,345)$         
Total Invested Capital 18,677$        22,066$        31,288$        33,606$        34,542$        36,860$        38,193$        38,434$        37,932$        40,032$        36,760$        
FINANCIAL & EQUITY
Financial
Long-Term Debt and Finance Leases, including current maturities 7,332$          8,834$          9,771$          12,333$        12,618$        11,469$        10,037$        9,996$          9,924$          11,429$        10,646$        
Total Long-Term Debt 7,008$          8,440$          9,368$          11,668$        11,882$        10,678$        9,204$          9,135$          9,048$          10,358$        9,337$          
Finance Leases 324$              394$              403$              665$              737$              792$              833$              861$              877$              1,071$          1,309$          
Excess Cash (1,373)$         (365)$            -$               (1,896)$         (3,144)$         (1,485)$         (409)$            (1,722)$         (3,484)$         (10,652)$       (21,335)$       
Operating Leases -$               -$               6,756$          6,715$          6,849$          6,995$          7,150$          7,320$          7,341$          7,998$          8,740$          
Hedge Position - Interest Rate -$               -$               (1)$                 -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               -$               
Fuel card obligation 431$              1,067$          1,075$          1,075$          1,075$          1,075$          1,075$          1,075$          1,075$          1,075$          1,075$          
Net Debt 6,390$          9,536$          17,601$        18,227$        17,398$        18,054$        17,853$        16,668$        14,857$        9,850$          (874)$            
Equity
Total stockholders' equity 12,287$        12,530$        13,687$        15,379$        17,144$        18,806$        20,340$        21,765$        23,075$        30,182$        37,634$        
Total Net Debt & Stockholders' Equity 18,677$        22,066$        31,288$        33,606$        34,542$        36,860$        38,193$        38,434$        37,932$        40,032$        36,760$        
Year Ended December 31,
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Disclosures and Disclaimers 
Buy Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) of 
more than 10% over a 12-month period. 
Hold Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
between 0% and 10% over a 12-month period. 
Sell Expected negative total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend 
yield) over a 12-month period. 
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Back in early 2019, speculations on Delta intentions to sell-off its refinery plant arise. Though, 
2019 shown to be a tough year for oil markets, with major producers founding the industry in 
an oversupply situation and with prices dipping. Hedging activity, for those airlines adopting 
that policy, yielded significant losses, given the unexpected decline in fuel prices. Delta, via 
Monroe Energy (under normal activity conditions), has historically managed to obtain average 
costs per gallon below its peers’ cost, therefore intentions to unload a partial stake of the refinery 
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The Attempt To Sell Monroe Energy LLC  
During 2018, near the end of September quarter, Delta Air Lines, through some investment banks, namely 
Barclays and Jefferies, tried to organize the auction (at least partial) of its refinery plant, acquired in 2012 (for 
$150 mln), i.e., Monroe Energy LLC. Though, Delta was not able to find an investment partner. At the time, 
Paul Jacobson, Delta’s CFO, stated that “after several years of ownership it was natural for Delta to seek 
other opportunities to optimize the benefits to Delta and maximize the value of other aspects of the refinery 
for a potential joint venture partner”, suggesting that the airline’s intentions were more strategic-oriented 
rather than purely financial, especially given the fact that in the previous FY (i.e., 2017) the Trainer refinery 
has yielded positive operating income, which ultimately contributed for the reduction of the average cost per 
fuel gallon. Though, during 2018, refinery’s operations were disrupted for a 60 days period, due to a planned 
maintenance intervention. This negatively impacted Monroe’s margins and, consequently, Delta’s fuel costs 
supported. Taking into consideration both Monroe’s financial condition (which suggests to positively affect 
Delta’s results under normal activity conditions) and its business specificities, gives enough evidence to 
understand Delta’s move as an attempt to find a strategic specialized-partner with whom the airline could 
share the risks associated with running an energy business. Given the increasing concerns around oil markets, 
namely price unpredictability, trade-wars, environmental and regulatory matters, such as IMO 2020, or the 
legal requirements to purchase credits for allowance to operate, i.e., Renewable Identification Numbers 
("RINs")), seems that the refinery segment of the company is becoming more complex and requiring more 
oversight from Delta’s management, which would imply more focus in detriment of its core airline’s 
business. That coupled with a required and continuous CAPEX investments (as oil refinery is a capital-
intensive industry) poses the trigger seen behind Delta’s decision to divest on Monroe. 
Impact Of Fuel Prices On Airlines’ Profitability 
Before moving into a more detailed analysis it matters to understand the magnitude of airlines’ exposure to 
fuel prices volatility and how does it impact their profitability. Considering the weekly returns of airlines’ 
stocks against the market price of oil (WTI Cmdty) performance, it is possible to assess that it exists a 
moderate negative correlation between the two variables, i.e. between -0.50399 and -0.39900 (depending on 
the Industry Index considered). However, looking for each peer,  American Airlines (AAL) somehow 
detaches from the pattern here being traced, given its low correlation coefficient, suggesting that, its stock 
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performance is not so much adversely affected by positive fluctuations in the fuel price, as other peers 
demonstrate to be – a topic to develop further. Though, these numbers only provide a broad picture of the 
adverse impact that increases in the fuel prices have in the airlines’ stock performance. To better realize the 
nature of that impact on airlines’ profitability a correlation analysis between the fuel prices variation and the 
US airlines’ operating margin was performed, considering data from 2000 until 2018 (or 2019Q3, when 
available). This exercise has shown correlation coefficients below -0.30 (comparing with both WTI Cmdty 
and ARGUS US Jet Fuel Index, -0.28320 and -0.29593, respectively). Looking at an “even deeper” level of 
profitability (i.e., net margin) the correlation found is much less evident as well, yielding coefficients around 
-0.14. This is largely explained by 3 factors: i) airlines’ typically passthrough fluctuations in fuel costs to 
passengers in order to mitigate part of the inherent adverse effect of it (reducing so the volatility of their profit 
margins); ii) even being that much volatile, fuel expenses historically make up to ~20.5% of OPEX and 
~21.3% of revenues, on average, and do not exceed 31.6% and 32.8%, respectively; iii) airlines do typically 
hedge against fuel price risk, which distorts the impact fuel price fluctuations would have otherwise (this 
particularly explains the poor correlation with the net margin, as a significant part of hedge activity 
income/losses comes reflected after the operating income). However, if performing the same correlation test 
considering the fuel expense as % of operating revenues and as % of OPEX, it might be found evidence of 
strong negative correlation (around -0.90). For this analysis, quarterly data until 2019Q3 were used, and that 
allowed to verify that the stronger correlation between fuel prices and  fuel expense as % of operating revenue 
is obtained when considering the fuel prices with 1-quarter of lag (i.e., the prices from the historical quarter 
before the reference period). This somehow traduces the common practice amongst airlines to cover their 
fuel needs upfront, typically by entering in forward and/or swap contracts with 1-3 months of antecedence. 
Overall analysis output with statistical evidence to support these findings can be found just after. 
Correlation Analysis: US Airlines’ Stock Performance vs. WTI Cmdty Performance 
Stock DJUSAR Ind  AXGAL Ind DAL US Eq AAL US Eq  UAL US Eq  LUV US Eq ALK US Eq 
Correl Coeff -0.50399 -0.39900 -0.38311 -0.20998 -0.30356 -0.48951 -0.75521 
Correlation Analysis: US Airlines Profit Margins and Fuel Expense vs. Oil/Fuel Prices Other Statistical Info 
 WTI Cmdty ARGUS US JetFuel Index Max Min Avg. 
Operating Margin (%) 1 -0.28320 -0.29593 16.6% -11.3% 3.3% 
Net Margin (%) 1 -0.13906 -0.14199 14.7% -24.1% -0.3% 
Fuel Exp as % of OPEX 1 -0.97242 -0.96013 31.6% 11.7% 21.3% 
Fuel Exp as % of Operating 
Revenue (Fuel without lag) 2 
-0.88323 -0.89741 
33.24% 9.71% 18.31% 
Fuel Exp as % of Operating 
Revenue (Fuel with 1Q of lag) 2 
-0.91237 -0.90096 
1 based on yearly data (2000-2018); 2 based on quarterly data (2000-2019Q3) 
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Monroe Energy LLC, Is Delta Taking The Upsides Of It? 
Monroe Energy has an installed capacity to fulfil around 75% of DAL’s fuel needs, though only in 2017 and 
during 2019 it was in full scale activity. Thus, to assess the magnitude the refinery’s operations impact on 
DAL’s fuel cost supported, one may compare its average cost per fuel gallon with the one supported by its peers 
throughout the time. For this purpose, quarterly financial data from 2016Q1 to 2019Q3 was considered. The 
findings of this analysis show that under Monroe’s normal activity conditions, DAL is able to obtain an average 
cost per fuel gallon below its peers’ combined average. In fact, only in 2018FY DAL has supported higher fuel 
costs than its peers ($ 2.19/gal vs. $ 2.14/gal), and that might be partly explained by the 60 days of disruption in 
Monroe’s production due to a planned technical maintenance event that occurred during the year. On average 
terms, during the analysis period, with exception of 2018FY, the average cost per fuel gallon supported by DAL 
was $ 0.04/gal lower than its peers. That was somewhat backed by the Monroe’s average supply cost per fuel 
gallon below the average price DAL’s peers support. Even though, one should be cautious when looking at 
these numbers and not trace direct links to Monroe’s profitability, because despite 2018FY has been the only 
year when DAL’s fuel costs per gallon were higher than its peers, in fact that year Monroe reported a operating 
income of  $58mln. In opposite, in 2016FY, Monroe had an operating loss of $125mln, which was traduced in 
an average supply cost per fuel gallon of $1.50, above DAL’s reported average cost per fuel gallon consumed 
of $1.49. Notwithstanding, this well poses the direct linkage existing between the refinery’s profitability and the 
magnitude of its contribution to DAL’s overall fuel cost. Regarding profitability of operations, it precisely where 
major concerns might arise for Delta (and that might pose the financial motivation to sell-off Monroe) given 
that, despite the positive contribution for the airline’s fuel cost supported, Monroe has been showing a 
deterioration of its profit margins – in 2018FY, EBITDA margin was 2.3% and the operating margin was 1.1%, 
2.95x and 5.76x lower than in 2015FY, respectively. This concerns gain even more relevance when comparing 































































































































Fuel Expense as % of Operating Revenue ARGUS US JetFuel Index (t-1), in $/gal
Graphical Output 1 | Fuel Expense as % of Operating Revenue vs. ARGUS US JetFuel Index (1Q of lag), in $/gal 
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Hedging And Fuel Prices Outlook 
Lastly, in line with analysis conducted so far, it matters to enhance the below-average costs of fuel supported 
by AAL. Through the performed correlation analysis between US airlines’ average cost per fuel gallon 
consumed and the ARGUS US JetFuel Index price per gallon, it was possible to infer that AAL was the airline 
with lower correlation when considering it with 1Q of lag, suggesting that the company does not rely that much 
on fuel price risk hedging instruments. In fact, since AAL merged with US Airways, in 2013, a non-hedging 
policy was implemented (instead, the airline passthrough the fluctuations in fuel prices to passengers’ fares). 
This seems to be paying-off the risk and is one of the major explanations for AAL’s lower cost with fuel, 
particularly comparing to DAL, that since 2015 has accumulated ~$1.2bln in fuel hedge losses (only during the 
2 last years achieved some gains). United Airlines (UAL), that followed a hedging policy until so far, stopped 
to do so in 2018. Explanations for that philosophy shift, that starts to be seen amongst US airlines, rely on 2 
major factors: i) in fact, when entering in hedging contracts, regardless of the derivative instrument, companies 
bear some additional transaction costs, hence in order to gain on hedge, they not only need fuel prices to go 
above the price they lock, as they “need” even higher fuel prices to reward the extra transaction cost they 
support; ii) latter years, US airlines’ hedging contracts have locked prices way above what they actually become, 
largely because market has gradually became oversupplied driving fuel prices to a weak growth, or even to 
decrease. Concerning this, in fact, in the explicit horizon until 2022, projections for fuel price does not go beyond 
$62.5/bbl (and $65/bbl, in 2020)  and the uncertainty around it shows a wider bearish sentiment rather than a 






































































































































2016FY 2017FY 2018FY 2019Q3
Graphical Output 2 | US Airlines’ Avg. Cost 
Per Fuel Gallon Consumed  
Graphical Output 3 | DAL’s Avg. Cost Per 
Fuel Gallon Consumed vs Peers and 
ARGUS US JetFuel Index  
Graphical Output 3 | Monroe Energy 
EBITDA (bar with transparency) and 
EBIT (solid bar) vs US Refinery Peers 
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With demand growing less than expected, during 2019, OPEC shown some flexibility by cutting outputs in 
order to put a floor under oil prices. Though, if demand growth keeps decelerating, it is not predictable until 
when this OPEC’s strategy will be economically efficient, as it will constraint scale production and refineries' 
production break-even might be questioned, so as their profitability. Moreover, by now only IMO 2020 and 
some progresses towards a deal in US-China tension is driving the base case and bullish sentiment on fuel. On 
the other hand, nowadays, behavioural concerns are progressively weighing more on demand rather than the 
pure economic perspective, particularly given the insurgence of new more sustainable energy sources and 
efforts towards fuel consumption efficiency, driving the industry to an oversupply condition. The evidence 
found prove that Monroe positively contribute to reduce Delta’s fuel cost, but, having it all, until which fuel 
price level is it worthy for Delta to keep the refinery’s supply? This question arises because the upsides that 
Delta capture from Monroe are mainly driven by the lower crack spreads (i.e., the cost to refine oil into jet fuel) 
it can generate and associated fuel transportation costs. Though, if the pure cost of Brent falls lower than a certain 
level, Monroe’s ability to supply refined jet fuel at an economically competitive prices, i.e. below its comps 
with larger production capacity (hence lower crack spread), is limited (particularly given its trend of profit 
margins deterioration) and, in such scenario, Delta would be better-off without Monroe’s supply. To have a 
clear picture and robust evidence of this rationale, one should perform a break-even analysis, however Delta 
lacks on providing the proper segregation between Monroe’s fixed and variable costs that is required to do so. 
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Events That Could Disrupt EIA’s Base Case Scenario 
▼ Global economy stagnates and dampens oil demand growth; 
▼ OPEC fails on its supply cuts strategy and/or abandons price control 
mechanisms aiming to defend its market share and keep absorbing benefits of 
scale production; 
▼ US shale oil keeps growing, offsetting OPEC’s throughput cuts; 
▲ Venezuelan production drops deeper below 1MMb/d and tougher sanctions 
reduce Iranian output by +0.5MMb/d, leading to further disruption in OPEC’s 
supply capacity to absorb demand; 
▲ MARPOL finds shipping industry unready to comply with IMO2020 sulphur cap 
and fulfil end-user demand; 
▬ US-China Trade War:  Impact on oil prices is dependent on whether both 
economies achieve an agreement to soften tensions and rebound world economy 
(▲) or they intensify sanctions on each other’s trade agreements, leading to further 
slowdown in China’s economy, hence further slowdown in oil demand (▼); 
▼ Commitments to reduce businesses’ environmental impacts, such as carbon-
neutrality, or the introduction of new more efficient aircraft engines in airlines 
industry, dictates a sooner than anticipated turnaround in energy sources, 
promoting a slash in oil demand. 
